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THE FIRST AMENDMENT COMES OF AGE:
THE EMERGENCE OF FREE SPEECH IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
G. Edward White*
INTRODUCTION
As the number of issues perceived as having First Amendment im
plications continues to grow, and the coterie of potential beneficiaries
of First Amendment protection continues to widen - including not
only the traditional oppressed mavericks and despised dissenters but
some rich and powerful members from the circles of political and eco
nomic orthodoxy - alarms have been sounded. Another period of
stocktaking for free speech theory appears to be dawning, and some re
cent commentators have proposed a retrenchment from the long twenti
eth-century progression of increasingly speech-protective interpretations
of the First Amendment. At the heart of the retrenchment literature lies
the belief that some forms of expression are incompatible with the aspi
rations of contemporary Americans for a civic-minded, decent, compas
sionate, and responsible society. 1
One might attribute to the contributions of retrenchment advocates
an implicit questioning of the special constitutional and cultural status
of free speech in America. Such a reading invites parallels between the
perspective of retrenchment commentators and a much older view of
the status of speech. That view was embodied in an often anthologized
attack on Justice Holmes's dissent in

Abrams v. United States2 made

by

John Wigmore in 1920. In his attack Wigmore distinguished between
"Freedom of Speech" and "Freedom of Thuggery," and maintained
* University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, Univer
sity of Virginia. B.A. 1963, Amherst; M.A., Ph.D. 1967, Yale; J.D. 1970, Harvard. Ed. My thanks to Vmcent Blasi, Mary Anne Case, Barry Cushman, Stephen J. Feldman,
Jack Goldslnith, Mark Graber, Thomas Andrew Green, John Harrison, Michael Klar
man, Alfred S. Konefsky, Peter Linzer, Robert Post, David Rabban, John Henry Schle
gel, and Michael Seidman for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks
also to Cathleen Curran for research assistance. An early draft of the article was
presented at the Faculty Workshop at the University of Vrrginia School of Law. I appre
ciate the constructive irreverence with which many of my colleagues reacted to the
presentation.

1. See infra text accompanying notes 270-92 (discussing relevant sources).
2. 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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that a civilized society such as the United States, whose members en
joyed ample freedoms, had the capacity to distinguish those utterances
that enhanced the body politic from those that corroded it. Wigmore
suggested that American citizens had a moral, as well as a legal, right
to repress speech that passed the boundaries of civilized interchange
and accordingly threatened the fabric of the community.3
I am not primarily interested here in exploring the parallels be
tween Wigmore's perspective on free speech and that exhibited by cur
rent retrenchment advocates. Nor is my central concern with the sali
ency of various arguments advanced in retrenchment commentary. The
recent proposed retrenchment of libertarian free speech theory has stim
ulated me to consider a broader issue: How did free speech, and the
First Amendment, come to be treated as special, both constitutionally
and culturally, in America?
It is remarkable, given the significant attention to First Amendment
issues in legal commentary, that no detailed explanation for the special
status of free speech in twentieth-century America hitherto has been ad
vanced. It is conventional wisdom in current constitutional jurispru
dence that the First Amendment, and the idea of protection for free
speech, have been regarded for several decades as being at the very
center of the American constitutional enterprise, whereas before World
War I both the First Amendment and the idea of freedom of speech oc
cupied a far more marginal status. Moreover, because of the increasing
anthologization of some important work on the role of free speech in
the late nineteenth century, scholars and students have a clearer under
standing

of

the

"prehistory"

of

modem

First

Amendment

jurisprudence.4
But as yet no comprehensive inquiry has been undertaken into the
question of why the First Amendment and freedom of speech "came of
age," that is, came to occupy the status of constitutional and cultural

3. See John H. Wigmore, Abrams v. United States: Freedom of Speech and Free
dom of Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539, 552-54 (1920).
4. The most significant contributors have been David Rabban and Mark Graber.
See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY
OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1205 (1983) [hereinafter Rabban, Emer
gence]; David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J.
514 (1981) [hereinafter Rabban, Forgotten Years]; David M. Rabban, The Free Speech
League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions ofFree Speech in American History, 45
STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992); David M. Rabban, The /WW Free Speech Fights and Popu
lar Conceptions ofFree Expression Before World War I, 80 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1994);
David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795 (1985) (reviewing LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PREss (1985)).

First Amendment

November 1996]

301

lodestars, in twentieth-century America.5 This article attempts such an
inquiry, and in the process seeks to revise some conventional wisdom
on a related subject: the origins and evolution of the bifurcated review
project, in which constitutional challenges to legislative infringements
on property rights or economic activity received a lower level of judi
cial scrutiny than constitutional challenges to legislative infringements
on noneconomic "rights" or "liberties."
Specifically, I argue in this article that the most complete and sat
isfactory account of the twentieth-century jurisprudential and cultural
emergence of the First Amendment and the idea of freedom of speech
is one that associates the elevation of speech to special status with the
emergence, in the early years of the twentieth century, of a "modern
ist" consciousness. This modernist consciousness bore a distinctive re
lationship to democracy and capitalism, the two prominent political and

economic models of what I call "modernity. "6

In addition, I argue that the bifurcated review project, convention
ally identified as beginning with Chief Justice Stone's celebrated "foot
note four" in the

1938

case of

United States

v.

Carolene Products Co.,1

5. Michael K.larman's article, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo
lutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1 (1996), demonstrates an awareness of the absence of histori
cal inquiries into the emergence of free speech as a particularly important constitutional
and cultural concept in twentieth-century America, and offers a preliminary hypothesis
for making sense of that emergence. See id. at 34, 39-41. K.larman's hypothesis attaches
significance both to particularistic political and economic coalitions within American
culture in the period between World War I and World War II and to the effect of those
coalitions on constitutional litigation and the process of judicial appointment.
This explanation, insofar as it stresses the role of World War I as a cause of altered
attitudes toward speech, tracks an argument made by Rabban. See Rabban, Emergence,
supra note 4, at 1213-16, 1313-15. The importance of World War I also is emphasized
in the work of the leading historian of free speech in twentieth-century America, Paul
Murphy. See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
FmsT AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM Wn.soN TO FDR 4, 21-22 (1972). That hy
pothesis is not inconsistent with the explanatory framework set forth in this article, but I
believe it is incomplete. The question is not only why, after many years, Congress
sought to restrict speech in statutes passed against the backdrop of World War I, but
also why those statutes were challenged on constitutional grounds, and why a new,
more speech-protective approach to the First Amendment emerged as a result of the
challenges. The wartime context of the cases, which accentuated the negative conse
quences of allegedly "subversive" speech, might have suggested otherwise.
In short, previous commentators have tended to suggest that free speech emerged
to a position of constitutional and cultural stature because of factors external to the al
tered intellectual meaning of the concepts of "freedom" and "speech" themselves. This
article suggests that a full explanation of the rise of the First Amendment to constitu
tional and cultural prominence also must explore the nature of that altered intellectual
meaning.
6. For definitions of modernist consciousness and modernity, see infra text accom
panying notes 8-17.
7. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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began several years earlier and was centered on speech cases. I also ar
gue that although the expanded governmental regulatory apparatus that
emerged in the early twentieth century was a necessary condition for bi
furcated review, it was not a sufficient condition: on a theoretical level,
that regulatory apparatus could have been accommodated through judi
cial deference to legislative regulation of all types of constitutionally
based liberties. Bifurcated review emerged with the perception that
speech was a special sort of liberty and deserved particular judicial so
licitude in a modem democratic society.
Finally, I argue that as the progression of twentieth-century free
speech jurisprudence has played itself out from the early twentieth cen
tury until the present, the original, self-reinforcing modernist premises
that elevated speech to special status in America have fragmented and
become self-opposing. This development potentially threatens not only
the enhanced role of speech but the intelligibility of the bifurcated re
view project itself.
My argument is presented in the form of an intellectual history of
free speech theory in twentieth-century America, with particular atten
tion to the contributions of prominent commentators advancing succes
sive rationales for giving special protection to speech. The primary pur
pose of that history, however, is not to describe the views of those
commentators, whose contributions are familiar to students of First
Amendment issues. It is rather to trace the emergence, and subsequent
refinement and fragmentation, of the central intellectual premises driv
ing twentieth-century free speech jurisprudence, and thus to establish
the existence of a paradox that current First Amendment theorists must
now confront When everyone can speak, and everything can be said,
speech has ceased to be special.
I.

A DEFINITIONAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In this Part I set forth the framework for the intellectual history of

First Amendment jurisprudence that follows, including definitions of
some recurrent terms. I make no effort at this point to detail the connec
tions between what I call modernist consciousness and the successive
rationales for the protection of free speech that are discussed in this ar
ticle. As a consequence, the framework may appear somewhat abstract.
It seems useful, however, to prefigure the orientation of my argument in
advance, and to suggest where its emphasis will differ from those of
conventional accounts.

First Amendment
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The Premises of Modernist Jurists

"Modernist" and "modernism" are ubiquitous and multifaceted
terms that have been associated with the emotive as well as the cogni
tive realms of consciousness, and with developments in the arts, the hu
manities, and the sciences. This article focuses generally on the connec
tions between modernism and unfolding doctrinal and theoretical
developments in twentieth-century First Amendment jurisprudence.
Given the professional orientation of the leading participants in that his
tory - all writers about law - I both follow and depart from the help
ful recent characterizations made by Dorothy Ross,8 and hence I employ
the term modernist in a particularistic fashion in this article.
I use the term "modernist" to identify a perspectival orientation,
or consciousness, characterized by a distinctive set of culturally and
temporally bounded starting intellectual premises. Ross associates mod
ernist consciousness with "the turn-of the-[nineteenth-] century recogni
tion of the subjectivity of perception and cognition. "9 David Hollinger
expands upon Ross's definition by equating modernist consciousness
with an "enthusiasm" for "the cognitive capability of human beings,"
around which "[a] distinctive culture uniquely appropriate for modem
society" could be "organize[d]."10 I accept Ross's and Hollinger's gen
eral formulation, but it requires some particularization as applied to the
legal writers I survey in this article. Whereas Ross and Hollinger note
that some modernists in the arts and humanities treated the discovery of
innate subjectivity as a source of alienation and skepticism, a basis for
recoiling from modernity, the modernist writers on law whom I discuss
assumed that the cognitive capabilities of humans would be a source of
enlightened, human-fashioned policymaking, provided that policies
were grounded in rationality and empirically based truth.
Thus the orientation of the modernist legal writers I consider
closely resembles that ascribed to certain American political scientists
by Raymond Seidelman, who identified adherents of a "philosophy of
modernism" in the discipline of political science between

1884

and

8. Dorothy Ross's introduction to her edition of a series of interpretive essays on
modernism represents in my judgment the clearest and most cogent effort to define and
locate modernist consciousness that has yet appeared. See Dorothy Ross, Modernism
Reconsidered, in MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 1 870-1930, at 1
(Dorothy Ross ed., 1994). Another helpful collection of essays is MODERNIST CUL
TURE IN AMERICA (Daniel Joseph Singal ed., 1991).
9. Ross, supra note 8, at 8.
10. David A. Hollinger, The Knower and the Artificer with Postscript 1993, in
MODERNIST IMPULSES IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 8, at 26, 32 (emphasis
omitted).
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1984. Modernist philosophy, Seidelman suggested, rested on the as
sumption that once scientific knowledge had been acquired, "conflicts
thought to be endemic to modern society could be rationally controlled,
mediated and contained justly, equitably, and democratically."11 The el
ements of modernist consciousness central to my subjects are identified
in Seidelman's characterization: the value of scientific knowledge, the
importance of rationality, and the significance of the democratic process
in furthering individual freedom of thought. I am calling these elements
cognitive freedom, rationalism, and empiricism.12
The modernist writers surveyed in this article took humans to be
"free" in the deepest sense: free to master and to control their own
destinies. In holding this "freedom premise" they were rejecting a heri
tage of causative explanations for the universe that emphasized the
power of external, nonhuman forces, ranging from God to nature to in
exorable laws of political economy or social organization to determinist
theories of historical change. For them a recognition of the subjectivity
of perception and cognition meant much more than the belief that indi
vidual humans were capable of giving individual meaning to their life
experiences. It meant that humans had the potential - the freedom to alter those experiences.
But in this group of modernist judges and commentators the free
dom premise was subjected to two distinctive constraints. The con
straints trace back to the fact that the group inhabited the professional
sphere of practical policymaking. The recognition of cognitive human
subjectivity was more than a stunning epistemological insight for them;
it had potentially ominous governance consequences. Radical subjectiv
ity, coupled with the brute fact of power, appeared to revive two of the
endemic problems of governance in past societies - tyranny and arbi-

1 1 . RAYMOND SEIDELMAN, DISENCHANTED REALISTS: POLITICAL SCIENCE

AND THE AMERICAN Crus1s, 1884-1984, at 9-10 (1985).
12. I use the term "cognitive freedom" to distinguish those dimensions of human
subjectivity directed toward the processes of "knowing" or "thinking" from those di
rected toward "emoting" or "feeling." See Hollinger, supra note 10, at 28-29. The ver
sion of subjective freedom exemplified in "aesthetic modernism," which Ross and Hol
linger identify primarily with responses in literature and the arts, see Ross, supra note 8,
at 8; Hollinger, supra note 10, at 28, was not a central element in the consciousness of
most of the writers I am describing.
Nonetheless the "freedom" associated with human subjectivity by modernist writ
ers was taken to include emotive as well as cognitive dimensions, so that the premises
of modernist consciousness implicitly conferred legitimacy on individualized aesthetic
responses to experience. Over time the emotive dimensions of modernist "freedom"
were to become incorporated in rationales for the protection of speech in American
First Amendment jurisprudence. See infra text accompanying notes 225-45. To signal
the emergence of that stage, I will replace the term "cognitive freedom" with the term
"freedom."
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trariness. Those features of premodern societies, when they existed, had
been justified by appeal to externally based theories of causal attribu
tion ("the King can do no wrong," "God's will"), but such theories
hitherto were rejected. How was the modern world, largely created by
humans themselves - a world in which democracy had replaced oligar
chy, capitalism had supplanted feudalism, science increasingly over
shadowed religion, and an essentially frozen status system had been
made increasingly mobile - to restrain the power of human will?
To deal with the potential connection between the freedom premise
and the prospect of tyrannical or arbitrary governance, modernist jurists
incorporated two constraints on the creative power of humans to func
tion as causal agents into their consciousness - rationalism and empiri
cism.13 Both ultimately helped cement the symbiotic relationship be
tween modernism and an elevated status for the First Amendment.
The constraint of rationalism posed a central distinction between
laws, rules, and policies that were arbitrary and those that were rational.
A rational decision, for modernist American jurists, was one that was
defensible and justifiable by appeal to something other than the power
and creative force of those making it.14 "Rationality" could be located
in the "common sense" of the people, as reflected in legislative judg
ments, or, increasingly in the twentieth century, in the "expertise" of
administrators, but it could not be located merely in the fact of
powerholding itself.
The freedom of humans to fashion rules or policies guiding their
own conduct also was constrained, for modernist jurists, by a require
ment that legal decisions be grounded in an appropriately empirical un
derstanding of the subjects affected by the decisions. The methodology
of empiricism had come into prominence with the emergence of science
as an important key to understanding the external world. It was based

13. Hollinger identifies rationalism and empiricism with the cognitive dimensions
of human subjectivity, encapsulating those premises in the figure of the scientist, a
"modern, intersubjective, empirical, professional Knower" who "eschew[s] imaginary
certainties and comforting illusions in order to face relentlessly the truth, developing
capacities for skepticism, disinterestedness, and rigorous analysis." Hollinger,
supra note 10, at 37. Early twentieth-century American jurists often defined law as a
science and viewed an important task of their profession as responding to the uncer
tainty and complexity of modern life by making the law more scientific. For a detailed
account of the infatuation of early twentieth-century legal academics with empirical so
cial science, see JOHN HENRY SCI-ll.E
. GEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRI
CAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
14. For discussions of the relationship of r;itionalism to modernist consciousness,
see RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 275-90 (1991); Den
nis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 263-64
(1992).
•

.

.
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on an assumption that through appropriately learned techniques of ob
servation and deduction, finite, objective truths about the universe could
be ascertained. As such, empiricism was a check on the radical subjec
tivity of perception, but the insights of empiricist methodology were not
available to all: they required specialized training in the techniques that
elicited "truth." Thus alongside a commitment to the constraint of em
piricism went a faith that the truths unearthed by experts presumptively
were worth more than those of the lay public.15
B.

Modernist Consciousness and Rationales for the Protection of
Speech
Much of the remainder of this article will demonstrate how each of

the starting premises of modernist consciousness influenced the devel
opment of free speech jurisprudence in America. Before taking up the
details of that process, however, it is worth pointing out two additional
analytical themes that frame the twentieth-century intellectual history of
free speech.
The first of those themes focuses on the connections between the
premises of modernist consciousness and the major philosophical ratio
nales for the protection of free speech in American society that surfaced
over the course of the twentieth century.
I have suggested that the freedom premise of modernist conscious

ness emphasized the capacity of humans to master their experience and
in effect to create their own destiny: it was a powerful affirmation of
the capacity and potential of the individual. The philosophical rationale
for protecting speech most intimately associated with the freedom pre
mise would appear to be one emphasizing speech as a particularly fun
damental component in the affirm ation of human freedom. That ratio
nale eventually surfaced in free speech jurisprudence under the heading
of individual autonomy or self-fulfillment. However, for historical rea-

15. In a recent history of the idea of democracy in America from the 1820s to the
1990s, Robert Wiebe argues that the decade between 1914 and 1924 was one in which
two developments occurred in the realm of ideas about democratic theory: a loss of
confidence in "the people" as a repository of wisdom, with a corresponding rise in the
status of experts as enlightened policymakers; and a shift in the normative thrust of de
mocracy from an emphasis on majority rule to an emphasis on expanded opportunities
for individuals. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 175-84 (1995). I will argue that a reformulation of the cul
tural meaning of democracy in America bore a close relationship both to the emergence
of modernism and to the expanded significance of free speech. Although I did not have
the benefit of Wiebe's observations in the process of developing that argument, and al
though his emphasis differs slightly from mine, his findings parallel and support my
own.
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sons, the self-fulfillment rationale was comparatively late to surface in
First Amendment doctrine and commentary.
The rationalism premise of modernist consciousness sought to
channel the freedom of human creativity along paths compatible with
effective and orderly governance. Rationalism, as a constraint on free
dom, suggested that not all versions of human mastery in the universe
were conducive to effective social organization; tyrannical and arbitrary
policies were, in fact, destructive of that goal. Analogically, not all ex
amples of the power and creativity of humans in the form of free ex
pression were useful; those retarding the formation of rational policies
of governance were inefficacious. Thus one can grasp an affinity be
tween the premise of rationalism and a second philosophical rationale
for the protection of speech, one that emphasized the channeling of self
expression toward the processes of rational policymaking. This rationale
was to appear in free speech jurisprudence under the rubric of "self
governance. ''
Finally, the empiricism premise of modernist consciousness sought
to impose upon the process by which humans extract meaning from
their experience a requirement that the meaning be "true" as distin
guished from "false," lest the potentially radical dimensions of cogni
tive subjectivity precipitate anarchic or excessively willful interpreta
tions of the external world. Empiricist techniques for observing and
generalizing about the universe were to be one of the chief sources of
true meanings. It followed from this commitment to empiricism as a
check on unlimited interpretive freedom that the principal value in free
dom of expression was as part of a process designed to distinguish true
ideas from false ones, what might be called a collective process of gath
ering information and distinguishing the true from the false meanings of
that information. The philosophical rationale for the protection of free
speech most akin to the empiricist dimensions of modernist conscious
ness was a rationale that emphasized freedom of expression as part of a
"search for truth" in the "marketplace of ideas."16
Chronologically, the three principal rationales for protection for
freedom of speech did not surface simultaneously in twentieth-century
First Amendment jurisprudence. The search for truth rationale came
first, to be followed by the self-governance and self-fulfillment ratio
nales. When one asks questions not only about the connections between

16. The "marketplace of ideas" was itself a testament to the cognitive capabilities
of human beings. Ideas were propounded by human actors and tested and found want
ing by human actors. No externally based truths overwhelmed those discerned by the
actors participating in the marketplace. Of course, as we shall see, the modernist jurists
being surveyed concluded that some human-discerned truths were better than others.
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the rationales and modernist consciousness, but about possible explana
tions for the chronology of the rationales' appearance, one must con
sider not only the intellectual premises that engendered the rationales
but their historical setting. One must explore not only modernist con
sciousness but the "actual world" of modernity itself.
C.

The Emergence of Free Speech and the Bifurcated Review Project
The First Amendment came of age in America at a particular point

in time. That period was characterized not only by the emergence of a
modernist consciousness, but by the presence of external features in
American culture that bore a generative relationship to that conscious
ness. According to Ross, modernity can be exemplified, in important
part, by a democratic model of politics and a capitalist model of eco
nomics.17 However, the status of those models, at the time free speech
was first taken seriously as a constitutional and cultural value in
America, was not identical.
As First Amendment jurisprudence became progressively speech
protective - beginning around World War I and stretching at least to
the 1980s - the democratic model of politics expanded in influence. At
the same time the capitalist model of economics, in its idealized late
nineteenth-century version of a laissez-faire economic marketplace
characterized by the absence of governmental regulation, receded in in
fluence. As the meaning and normative significance of democracy ex
panded, the model of capitalism as unregulated economic activity sepa
rated from democratic theory. Freedom in the political sphere became
embodied by democratic theory and practices, 18 but freedom in the eco
nomic sphere was pictured increasingly as producing inequitable distri
butions of power and wealth. Indeed, regulation of the economic mar
ketplace became associated with democratic theory.19
The increasing influence of the democratic model of politics rela
tive to the capitalist model of economics was reflected in a fundamental
development in American constitutional jurisprudence. The emergence
of free speech as constitutionally and culturally special was intimately
17. See Ross, supra note 8, at 8.
18. This transition was affected, as Wiebe suggests, by practices that emphasized
the opportunities of the individual citizen as a participant in collective governance. See
WIEBE, supra note 15, at 137.
19. Identification of the themes of an expanding conception of political democracy
and a contracting conception of economic freedom as defining elements of the political
economy of early and mid-twentieth century America can be found in nearly any stan
dard history of that period. See, e.g. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 344-47 (1963); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1 914-1932. at 8-9 (2d ed. 1993).
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tied to that development. I am calling that development the bifurcated
review project - an effort to fashion a double standard of constitu
tional review in which judges would defer to legislative regulation of
the economy but scrutinize legislative regulation of noneconomic rights,
including the right to free speech. The basis for that heightened scrutiny
was

the

close

connection

between

the

freedom

personified

in

noneconomic liberties and democratic theory. The basis for judicial def
erence to legislative regulation of economic rights was similar. Such
deference not only alleviated fears of an undemocratic substitution,
under the guise of constitutional interpretation, of judicial for legislative
theories of the economy, it left in place legislative regulations designed
to alleviate the undemocratic consequences of the unregulated economic
marketplace.
The bifurcated review project represented an effort to give concrete
effect to modernist premises. By fostering judicial deference in the area
of economic regulation, the project embraced the perceived truth that
unregulated economic activity actually infringed on the freedom of a
significant number of actors in the economic marketplace and rein
forced rational regulatory policies that were based on that truth. By fos
tering judicial scrutiny of legislative restrictions on speech and other
noneconomic liberties, the project underscored the centrality of the
modernist freedom premise when that premise could be associated with
the goals of democratic theory.
The evolution of free speech jurisprudence in twentieth-century
America thus can be seen as a series of episodes in which the major
premises of modernism, as interpreted by courts and commentators,
successively contributed to elevate the constitutional and cultural status
of free speech. At the same time, as those episodes produced alternative
rationales for the protection of speech, those rationales began to conflict
with, as w�ll as to reinforce, one another, and eventually came to
threaten, as well as to implement, the juristic goals of the bifurcated re
view project. The sharp separation between the juristic realms of
noneconomic and economic freedom had been the essence of the bifur
cated review project and arguably the essence of an enlightened mod
ernist approach to modernity. But as protection for speech began to dis
engage itself from democratic political theory and to invade the realm
of economic regulation, this sharp separation began to blur. The result
has been to stimulate a reconsideration of the significance of speech in
America.
My narrative of the First Amendment's coming of age divides the
twentieth-century intellectual history of free speech into five discrete
periods, in each of which an analysis of commentary and cases reveals
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the existence of distinct, but overlapping, jurisprudential rationales for
the protection of speech. fu the first four periods, that progression ex
hibits an increasingly libertarian, speech-protective First Amendment
jurisprudence, and an increasingly aggressive role for courts in constitu
tional review of free speech claims. fu the last period, which includes
the present, the libertarian progression has continued, but the associa
tion of a speech-protective approach to First Amendment issues with
democratic theory and with an implicit deference to economic regula
tion has become much less easy to discern. The tendencies of recent
free speech jurisprudence have fostered calls for a reconsideration of its
libertarian emphasis, and, arguably, for a less elevated constitutional
and cultural role for speech. The article concludes by suggesting that
this movement signals the deeply paradoxical and problematic status of
modernist-driven free speech jurisprudence.20
II.

COGNITIVE FREEDOM AND "THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH":

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE AND THE EMERGENCE OF A SPEECH
PROTECTIVE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A.

The Setting: Early Twentieth-Century Doctrinal and Theoretical
Orthodoxy
As late as 1915 the Supreme Court of the United States continued

to treat free speech cases as undeserving of special judicial solicitude.
Two venerable doctrinal formulations continued to control First Amend
ment jurisprudence. One was the position, represented in the 1897 case
of

Robertson v. Baldwin,21 that the Amendment did not institute "any

novel principles of government," but simply codified "certain guaran
ties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors,
and which from time immemorial had been subject to certain well-

20. It remains, in this introductory section, to locate this article within recent liter
ature on the twentieth-century history of the First Amendment. Although I believe that
the explanation offered here for the emergence of free speech in twentieth-century
America is novel, it builds not only on the aforementioned work of intellectual histori
ans on modernist consciousness and modernity, but on other recent work at the inter
faces of "new institutionalist" political science, philosophy, and constitutional history,
samples of which are cited in subsequent notes. I want to single out here the contribu
tions of two of my colleagues, Michael Klarman and Barry Cushman, whose interest in
twentieth-century constitutional and intellectual history has stimulated me to reexamine
my approach to those fields. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and
the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7 (1994); Klarman, supra note 5; Barry
Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from
Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105, 154 (1992); Barry Cushman,
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201 (1994).
21. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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recognized exceptions." This meant that speech that was regarded as
libelous, blasphemous, obscene, indecent, or "injurious to public mora1s
or private reputation" could be suppressed. 2 2
The other formulation confined constitutiona1 protection for free
speech to freedom from governmenta1ly imposed "prior restraints,"
such as the censorship of publications before they were issued. This po
sition dated back at least to William Blackstone's

Commentaries,

in

which Blackstone had defined "the liberty of the press" as protection
only from "laying no

previous

restraints upon publications," as distin

guished from "freedom from censure for crimina1 manner when pub
lished. "23 In a

1907

case in which a Colorado newspaper editor had

been convicted of contempt of court for publishing articles and a car
toon impugning the motives of judges of the Supreme Court of Colo
rado, the Court upheld the conviction. The author of the Court's opinion
was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who repeated Blackstone's prior
restraints dictum and held that even factually accurate (true) criticism of
judicia1 officia1s that tended to interfere with the administration of jus
tice could be crimina1ly punished. 24
The Supreme Court cases up through

Patterson

made free speech

cha1lenges to state or federa1 restrictions simple "police power" cases.
The test for whether the police power of the state could be invoked to
punish expression was whether the expression in question had a "bad
tendency" - that is, a tendency to injure public mora1s or private repu
tation or lead to other socia1ly injurious acts. Under this conception,
most free speech cases, which involved restrictions formulated by
states, were not First Amendment cases at all, but Fourteenth Amend
ment due process cases, testing the boundary between a liberty claim
and state police powers. Since the First Amendment had not been incor
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the lib
erty at stake was simply one of the ancient "rights" of English
speaking citizens. 25
22.
23.
24.
(1907).
25.

165 U.S. at 281.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 .
See Patterson v . Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 456, 462-63

Recent scholarship has revealed the existence of a tradition of libertarian com
mentary on issues implicating freedom of expression that can be traced back to the
years before the Civil War. In particular, groups such as the Free Speech League and
the International Workers of the World had initiated, by the early years of the twentieth
century, the practice of scrutinizing and challenging restrictions on speech in the press
and in public debate; by the early twentieth century libertarian theories of free speech
had begun to appear in "mainstream" academic writing. See sources cited supra note 4.
Late nineteenth-century libertarian free speech theory, however, cannot be seen as
fully reflective of a modernist consciousness. That commentary saw freedom of speech
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As a police power liberty, absolutist formulations of speech
seemed as potentially distasteful as "liberty of contract" when that doc
trine came under attack from early twentieth-century Progressive legal
theorists. The first instinct of many Progressive commentators, in fact,
was to continue to sweep free speech issues within the rubric of police
power analysis, and to emphasize the social interest in restricting dissi
dent speech to promote progress and civic harmony .26
The premodemist dimensions of libertarian free speech theory be
came significant when Congress, in the shadow of World War I, passed
two statutes that criminalized speech tending to encourage resistance to
the war effort or to undermine respect for the government and its opera
tions. 27 Indictments under those statutes raised the question, dormant for
so many years, of what the First Amendment's imprecation that "Con
gress shall make no law . . .abridging speech" meant in a wartime
setting.
The Supreme Court's

1919

decisions in a series of Espionage Act

Schenck v. United States28 and
Abrams v. United States,29 are among the most an-

and Sedition Act cases, beginning with
extending through

as a liberty akin to that of the due process liberty: a private right, such as property, that
in some contexts had an important public function such as disseminating information or
opinions on public issues. It was conceived of as an innate, prepolitical liberty, one of
the essential conditions of humanity but not in itself an illustration of the cognitive ca
pabilities of humans.
Recent scholarship also has shown increased attention to the theoretical dimensions
of late nineteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence, and particularly to the fascina
tion of that body of work with bright-line doctrinal categories designed to maintain a
fundamental distinction between the public and private spheres of social activity. See,
e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 10-15 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW]; Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Fonvard: The Constitu
tion of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv.
30, 101-03 (1993); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 10 N.C. L. REv. 1, 8, 23-24 (1991). Nonetheless very little at
tention has been devoted to grounding the categorical orientation of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century constitutional theory in premodernist assumptions about the cognitive
capabilities of humans as causative agents in the realm of political economy. For a pre
liminary effort, attempting to cabin James Bradley Thayer's deferential theory of judi
cial review in time, see G. Edward White, Revisiting James Bradley Thayer, 88 Nw. U.
L. REv. 48 (1993).
26. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 78-86; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Pro
gressive Social Thought, 14 TEXAS L. REv. 951, 958-59 (1996).
27. See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat 217 (codified as amended in scat
tered sections of 18, 22, 50 U.S.C.); Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat 553 (repealed
1921).
28. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
29. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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thologized cases in American constitutional law. In

Schenck Holmes an

nounced for the Court that "[t]he question in every [subversive advo
cacy] case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre
vent. "30 Holmes restated this test in

Abrams,

in dissent.31

I am concerned here with how Espionage Act and Sedition Act
cases provided a forum for a reconsideration of nineteenth-century free
speech

jurisprudential

orthodoxy.

That

reconsideration,

prompted

largely by the writing of Zechariah Chafee - particularly his glosses
on the Espionage Act opinions of Holmes - served to integrate and to
give new meaning to the diverse strands of free speech commentary
that were in existence by World War I. It also served to supply First
Amendment jurisprudence with its first modem set of theoretical apolo
getics, which associated protection for speech with a search for truth in
a democratic society.3 2

30. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.
31. "[T]he United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is
intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith cer
tain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent."
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The restatement was not insignificant,
and a good deal of commentary has been devoted to the development of Holmes's per
spective on free speech issues in the short interval between Schenck and Abrams. I re
view that commentary and discuss the internal history of Holmes's altered perspective
in G. EDWARD WmTE, JusTICE OLIVER WENDELL Hou.ms: LAW AND THE INNER
S ELF 414-36 (1993).
32. This article's emphasis on the role of Chafee and other legal commentators in
formulating rationales for the protection of speech, and in illustrating one or another of
the starting premises I have identified with a modernist juristic consciousness, raises
two questions about the place of such commentators in an intellectual history of consti
tutional concepts such as freedom of speech. The first question is what weight, if any,
can be attached to the views of commentators, given that they are not judges and thus
have no power to interpret the Constitution. The second is why the starting intellectual
premises of any particular commentator should be singled out as "representative" of a
larger body of opinion, so that, for example, the theoretical dilemmas illustrated in the
work of a given commentator can be seen as emblematic of dilemmas contained within
twentieth-century American juristic modernism itself.
I assume that the work of certain legal commentators does exert influence on con
stitutional interpretation, and I have attempted to chronicle that influence in this article.
In the cases of Zechariah Chafee and Alexander Meiklejohn such influence is readily
documented, and by doing so I intend to suggest that the writings of Chafee and
Meiklejohn had considerable influence on the theoretical grounding of Supreme Court
First Amendment cases even though both Chafee and Meiklejohn spent their careers as
academics.
My selection of the other two commentators, Thomas Emerson and Cass Sunstein,
is designed more to emphasize their role as "representative" intellectual and cultural
figures than as formative influences on judicial interpretations of the First Amendment.
I single out Emerson and Sunstein because I think that their respective approaches to
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were handed down during an

important transition period in the intellectual history of twentieth
century American jurisprudence. The first distinctly modernist political
movement in America, Progressivism, had become established, and so
ciological jurisprudence, the legal ideology of early twentieth-century
Progressives, had captured the attention of some sectors of the legal
academy.33 A notable dimension of sociological jurisprudence was its
critique of what Roscoe Pound called "mechanical jurisprudence": the
late nineteenth-century juristic emphasis on bright-line legal categories
and concepts.34 The sociological jurists' critique of the Court's majority
opinion in

Lochner v. New York,35

which they viewed as paradigmati

cally mechanical, was itself paradigmatically modernist.

Lochner

was

attacked for being insufficiently attentive to the "realities" of the indus
trial marketplace, and thus irrational; and at the same time for perpetu
ating outmoded assumptions about the coexistence of economic "free
dom" and democratic theory in a society where industrial capitalism
was the dominant model of enterprise.36
One feature of the Lochner decision that made it notorious for Pro
gressive critics was its embrace of the doctrine of "liberty of contract,"
which signified to them either a fiction or a nineteenth-century confu
sion of economic power with economic liberty. Having assumed that
liberty of contract was neither conceptually nor practically defensible,
modernist critics concluded that it functioned simply as a tool that
judges could employ to invalidate statutes that they felt threatened the
idealized domain of unregulated economic activity. This conclusion, of
course, also posited a modernist view of the judicial function as crea
tive.37 As Holmes had pointed out in his dissent in

Lochner,

liberty of

free speech issues clearly reveal their intellectual starting premises, and that those prem
ises can be shown to be illustrative of stages not only in the progression of twentieth
century First Amendment jurisprudence but in the progression of twentieth-century
modernism.
33. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurispru
dence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999,
1004 (1972).
34. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908);
see also HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 25, at 10-19
(describing the category-based tendency of nineteenth-century legal thought); David N.
Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in the Failure of Lais
sez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 Mo L. REv. 93 (1990); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in
Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1431.
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
36. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454, 464, 479-81
(1909).
37. The modernist recognition of human cognitive capabilities can be seen as sig
nificantly contributing to the collapse of the established jurisprudential assumption that
.
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contract was itself a judicial gloss on the Due Process Clauses.38
The modernist critique of liberty of contract suggested that a read
ing of the Due Process Clauses to develop a libertarian position toward
speech rights might be comparably susceptible to judicial abuse, and
might take on some of the baggage of an interpretive approach that was
being attacked as outmoded.39 But the instinctive attraction of some
Progressive scholars toward the idea of freedom of speech stimulated
them to try to reconcile a theory of curtailed constitutional protection
for economic liberties, embodied in the critique of Lochner, with a the
ory of expanded protection for freedom of expression in a democracy.40
That attempted reconciliation eventually blossomed into the project of
bifurcated constitutional review.
With the approach of World War I, some Progressive commenta
tors increasingly became concerned with the implications of dissident
speech for political and cultural solidarity.41 Certain other Progressive
theorists, however, had begun to associate protection for free speech
with the value of enhanced citizen participation in an industrializing,
democratizing society. One of the political goals of the Progressive
movement was to broaden the base of popular involvement in govern
ment and to encourage larger numbers of citizens to participate in pub
lic discourse, even though many Progressives held a selective view of
who those citizens should be.42 The modernist premise of freedom was
a thread linking many policies endorsed by Progressives, ranging from
enhanced bargaining power for workers in the industrial marketplace to
opposition to machine politics to enthusiasm for new scientific tech
niques that would relieve the drudgery of workplace and household rou-

judges merely "found" or "declared" law. That assumption can be identified with a
theory of causal attribution in the universe that located omnipotent causal agents, such
as disembodied principles of law, in entities and forces external to human will. For an
earlier effort to characterize the theory of judicial law declaration, described as an
"oracular theory of judging," and to trace its demise in the first three decades of the
twentieth century, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmoN
145-77 (expanded ed. 1988).
38. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39. One of the nineteenth-century commentators that had articulated a relatively
libertarian perspective on free speech issues was Thomas Cooley, one of the visible pro
ponents of the "liberty of contract" doctrine. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 8, 241
n.39. On Cooley's general jurisprudential orientation see GILLMAN, supra note 25, at
55-59.
40. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 87-95; Rabban, supra note 26, at 957-62.
41. See GRABER, supra note 4, at 77-86.
42. See ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LosT PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 193-95
(1994); WIEBE, supra note 15, at 162-65.
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tines.43 Freedom of speech, from this perspective, signified freedom of
political participation and freedom of inquiry.
B.

Chafee and the Reformulation of First Amendment Orthodoxy
As Progressive legal scholars sought to square their enhanced in

terpretation of freedom in a democracy with their increasing alienation
from what they saw as an excessively libertarian constitutional heritage,
Zechariah Chafee began his own reformulation of free speech jurispru
dence. In his

1920 treatise, Freedom of Speech,44 which was prompted

by the Espionage Act cases, Chafee employed three strategies as part of
his reformulation effort. First, he discarded the legacy of earlier libertar
ian speech theorists by treating their work as largely invisible, thereby
helping to cement the image of pre-World War I First Amendment juris
prudence as a period in which free speech issues were not given any se
rious attention.45 Second, he attempted a sharp separation of First
Amendment free speech jurisprudence, which he sought to invigorate,
from the legacy of police power liberty due process cases, which he
sought to discard. Finally, Chafee restated the philosophical rationale
for protecting free speech in America - resting protection for speech
on a "social interest" in enhanced public participation and informed
public debate in a democracy rather than on an individual interest in
self-expression. His reformulation supplied First Amendment jurispru
dence with the first of its twentieth-century bases for a speech
protective perspective: that protection for speech facilitated a search for
truth in the marketplace of ideas.
Chafee took pains to disassociate the liberty of speech and the
press from liberty of contract, and did so in a fashion that revealed his
modernist sensibility. He announced that his goal was to disengage the
"true meaning of free speech" from "talk about rights."46 In cases such
as the Espionage Act cases, he argued, "[t]he agitator asserts his consti
tutional right to speak [and] the government asserts its constitutional
right to wage war " : the "result is a deadlock." 47 Breaking this deadlock
required discarding the jurisprudence in which "free speech has been
regarded as merely an individual interest" and adopting an analysis em-

43. For examples of the policies see generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
44. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920).
45. The legacy discarded by Chafee was reclaimed by those scholars who recently
have documented the existence of late nineteenth-century libertarian free speech com
mentary. See sources cited supra note 4.
46. CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 34-35.
47. Id. at 34.
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phasizing "the balancing against each other of two very important so
cial interests," that of "public safety" and that of what Chafee called
"a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not
only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest
way."48
In another place in

Freedom of Speech

Chafee was to equate the

social interest in protecting free speech with "the need of continuous
contact with the facts and with sound conclusions. "49 Freedom of
speech led to truth, he believed, because the outpouring of ideas stimu
lated other ideas to be proposed as counters or correctives, and the re
sulting dialogue led its participants closer to the true facts of life.50
The normative bite of Chafee's proposed reformulation of free
speech jurisprudence was captured in a sentence reading, " [T]he great
interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in
public safety is really imperiled, and not, as most men believe, when it
is barely conceivable that it may be slightly affected."51 Chafee sug
gested that even in wartime, speech should be protected "unless it is
clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference with the con
duct of the war."52 One might notice how this formulation asserts a
great social interest in free speech, a comparable social interest in pub
lic safety, and then looks to empirical analysis (when is the safety of
the public really imperiled?) on which to ground a rational process of
balancing. By comparison the "bad tendency" test ("when it is barely
conceivable that [public safety ] may be slightly affected") appears un
duly vague, subjective, and irrationally underprotective of speech in
wartime.
In the short run, Chafee's reformulation had far greater impact on
theory than doctrine. His proposed test for determining whether speech
48. Id. at 36-38. In placing emphasis on social interests Chafee benefited from his
close contact with Progressives like Roscoe Pound. In his early twentieth-century schol
arship Pound had suggested that to the extent that legal "interests" were "balanced" in
a judicial decision, they needed to be balanced on the same plane, so that "social inter
ests" were balanced against "social interests." See Roscoe Pound, Interests of Person
ality (pt. 1), 28 HARV. L. R.Ev. 343, 344, 349 (1915). By giving "individual interests"
the same potential weight as social interests, Pound felt, judges were being insuffi
ciently sensitive to the contemporary social and economic consequences of their deci
sions. It invited the kind of "mechanical" analysis embodied by the majority opinion in
Lochner. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pt.
3), 25 HARv. L. R.Ev. 489, 492-95 (1912). On Chafee's connections with Progressive
thinkers, see DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY
AND LAW 81-84 (1986).
49. CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 179.
50. See id. at 36.
51. Id. at 38.
52. Id.
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should be protected, which was influenced by Learned Hand's holding
in

Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,53 was not adopted by the Supreme

Court in the Espionage Act cases. Even though Chafee roundly criti
cized the bad tendency test in free speech cases,54 Holmes employed it

Abrams, where the
Abrams, Holmes did not appear to
treat his celebrated "clear and present danger" dictum in Schenck56 as

for the Court in all the Espionage Act cases except
majority employed it.55 At least until

incompatible with the bad tendency test.57
Chafee, however, intimated that the Court adopted his reformula

Freedom of
Speech a conclusion he had advanced earlier in an article, Freedom of
Speech in Wartime, in the Harvard Law Review.58 There Chafee wrote
that in Schenck and the companion Espionage Act cases, in order to

tion as early as the Espionage Act cases. He repeated in

give force to the First Amendment, "Justice Holmes draws the bound
ary line very close to the test of incitement at common law and clearly
makes the punishment of words for their bad tendency impossible."59
This was what Chafee took Holmes to mean by " clear and present
danger."
Chafee took pains to suggest that Holmes's reformulation in

Abrams was "only an elaboration" of his dictum in Schenck. Chafee
was eager to bring Abrams within the "clear and present danger" line
of cases so that the doctrine would be linked with "Justice Holmes's
magnificent exposition of the philosophic basis" of the First Amend
ment.60 Holmes wrote in his

Abrams dissent:

But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and

53. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), revd., 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). Hand held in that
case that only speech that constituted a "direct incitement to violent resistance" is ille
gal. 244 F. at 540. Chafee dedicated the 1920 edition of Freedom of Speech to Hand.
54. See CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 25-32.
55. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
56. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
57. See WHITE, supra note 31, at 418-20 (discussing Holmes's use of "bad ten
dency" language and analysis in two Espionage Act cases following Schenck).
58. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932
(1919). Chafee had published an earlier version of this article. See Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1918, at 66.
59. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 58, at 967. In his book
Freedom of Speech, Chafee made a nearly identical statement. See CHAFEE, supra note
44, at 89.
60. CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 155.
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that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be car
ried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.61

Chafee was enthusiastic about this passage because Holmes clearly had
elevated the social interest in the search for truth as a foundation for
civic policymaking over any individual interest in expression. The "ul
timate good," Holmes suggested, was "free trade in ideas" rather than
the "foundations" of individual conduct. Individual "faiths" were
ephemeral, but the search for truth in the marketplace of ideas was per
manent, since truth was "the only ground" upon which policy could
"safely" be made.
Holmes's articulation in

Abrams

of the search for truth rationale

for protection of speech has regularly been celebrated as a def'ming mo
ment in the modern history of the First Amendment. Chafee himself
played a part in encouraging Holmes to rethink his view of free speech,
and scholars recently have come to realize the significant role Chafee
played in Holmes's adoption of a more speech-protective approach.62
But there has been little discussion of the extent to which the concept of
a search for truth in the marketplace of ideas can be connected to mod
ernist starting premises.
1\vo controlling assumptions appear to guide the famous words
from Holmes's

Abrams

dissent: that truth is the only basis on which ef

fective policy can be made, and that the "truth" of ideas is determined
simply by their survival in the marketplace. If ideas are essentially im
permanent and contextual, why would not the collective meaning of
truth also be? And if the truth of ideas were determined by their sur
vival in the current marketplace, why would that process produce any
thing other than the temporary elevation of majoritarian beliefs as to
what was true? In short, how could Holmes and Chafee imply that truth

61. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62. Between the decisions in Schenck and Abrams, Harold Laski and Felix Frank
furter, two Progressive acolytes of Holmes who had come to believe in the enhanced
importance of protection for free speech, had made Holmes aware of criticism of his
opinion for the Court in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), where he had up
held Eugene Debs's conviction under the Espionage Act for a speech in which he
stated, "I abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone." 249 U.S. at 214. That
decision was difficult to square with Holmes's "clear and present danger" language in
Schenck, and Ernst Freund had published an article that was highly critical of Holmes's
opinion. See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 3, 1919, at 13. Stimulated by conversations and correspondence over the summer
of 1919, with Frankfurter, Laski, and Learned Hand, Holmes began reading literature on
free speech, and in July met Chafee at a tea arranged by Laski. For the details of
Holmes's engagement with Chafee's writings and others on the subject of free speech in
the spring and summer of 1919, see WIDTE, supra note 31, at 420-30 and sources cited
therein.
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had any meaning independent of the collective prejudices of the
�

market?

It is possible to read Holmes's

Abrams

dissent as a forthright ex

pression of majoritarian fatalism, a reading some of his own comments
tend to support.63 This reading, however, is oversimple. To a limited ex
tent Holmes, and to a greater extent Chafee, sought to distinguish what
they meant by "truth" from mere majoritarian prejudices. Part of
Holmes's rationale for allowing expressions such as those suppressed in

Abrams

into the marketplace was based on an assumption that patently

foolish expressions - "silly leaflet[s]," "poor and puny anonymi
ties"64 - would by their very foolishness reveal their "falsity" and
permit more sensible alternatives to emerge. At least at this stage in his
free speech jurisprudence,65 Holmes seems to have included, within his
search for truth metaphor, both a commitment to the free exchange of
ideas and information in a democracy and an elitist reading of that ex
change process, in which the surfacing of truth would be accompanied
by a discarding of foolish ideas for rational ones. It was, after all,
Holmes himself, not Congress, who had labeled the leaflets in

Abrams

silly.

If Holmes and Chafee held this alternatively elitist and egalitarian
conception of speech at the moment that the search for truth rationale
for protection of speech first appeared,66 one could see how that con-

63. Take, for example, his definition of "truth" as "the prevailing can't help of
the majority," Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 1 1 , 1929), in
2 Hou.ms-LASKI LEITERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 1 124 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953), quoted in
WHITE, supra note 31, at 435, or "the majority vote of that nation that can lick all
others." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), quoted
in WHITE, supra note 31, at 435.
64. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628-29.
65. For an argument that Holmes held no consistent theory of free speech through
out his judicial career, but rather issued a series of rhetorical formulations, not necessar
ily consistent with one another, that demonstrated an increasingly speech-protective em
phasis in his jurisprudence, see WHITE, supra note 3 1 , at 412-54.
66. Such a view is harder to square with a statement made by Hn1mes in a later
free speech opinion that if "the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It is not clear by this sentence
whether Holmes meant to embrace only the process of exchanging ideas in the market
place or all results that the marketplace produced. If the latter, he would appear to be
content with repression of speech by the "dominant forces of the community" in those
instances in which those forces accepted the "beliefs expressed in proletarian dictator
ship" and such beliefs favored repression.
Attributing the above view to Holmes makes one of his subsequent definitions of
free speech, as "freedom for the thought that we hate," hard to understand. United
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ception would square with the starting premises of modernist conscious
ness, in which the creative freedom accorded humans as a consequence
of their cognitive capabilities was constrained by the obligations of ra
tionality and empiricism. Some ideas would necessarily be superior to
other ideas because they were predicated on a scientifically accurate un
derstanding of the defining social and economic facts of a civilization at
a point in its history. Being empirically grounded, they took on the
character of truth. Being true, they lent a dimension of rationality to the
public policies they produced, making the wishes of policymakers capa
ble of being carried out safely.
Despite Chafee's and Holmes's efforts, the marketplace theory of
free speech and the "clear and present danger" formula for speech
cases only slowly became orthodoxy. Chafee's and Holmes's formula
tion faced two interrelated problems. The first was a practical one: de
spite Holmes's claim in

Abrams

that "clear and present danger" was

the Court's test for determining whether speech in a given case had
been subversive, a majority of the Court continued to equate clear and
present danger with the established bad tendency test.67 At the time of

States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled by
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Moreover, in discussing the pacifist sen
timents that had caused Rosika Schwimmer to be threatened with deportation, Holmes
noted to Harold Laski that " [a]ll 'isms [including pacifism] seem to me silly - but this
hyperaethereal respect for human life seems perhaps the silliest of all." Letter from Oli
ver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETIERS,
supra note 63, at 1 146, quoted in WHITE, supra note 31, at 583 n.292. So I am inclined
to believe that implicit in Holmes's marketplace of ideas rationale for protecting speech
was an elitist view of that market silly ideas simply would not prevail. Such a view, of
course, equates freedom of speech not only with empirically based truth but with an as
sumption that the process of exchanging ideas eventually produces rational outcomes.
As for Chafee, his statement that he could not sit down for half an hour's conver
sation with the great majority of persons who had spoken out against the war "without
losing [his] temper," but that he wished to see them treated consistently with the princi
ple of freedom of speech, could be read as combining similar elitist and egalitarian in
terpretations of the marketplace of ideas. See CHAFEE, supra note 44, at 2.
67. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Fiske, in which the
Court unanimously invalidated a conviction under the Kansas Criminal Syndicalism Act
for soliciting members of a local branch of the International Workers of the World, used
the same bad tendency test and adopted the same police power balancing analysis as
had Gitlow and Whitney. It presumably reached a different outcome from the majority
opinions in those cases because the only evidence offered by the state was a copy of the
preamble to the IWW's constitution, which stopped short of advocating unlawful
activity.
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only Justice Louis Bran

deis had joined him in repudiating the bad tendency formula.68
The second problem was methodological. Chafee had insisted on
abandoning police power methodology in speech cases for a balancing
of the social interests in public safety and the search for truth in a dem
ocratic society. At the same time he had claimed that Holmes had de
signed the clear and present danger test to draw a boundary line be
tween protected and unprotected speech claims. The methodological
ambiguities in Chafee's formulation crept into the clear and present
danger test itself.

It was not obvious, for example, that shifting to social interest bal
ancing in speech cases would have normative effects consistent with
greater protection for speech. It might, in fact, have the opposite effect.
Cases such as

Gitlow v. New York,

which reviewed a New York statute

providing criminal penalties for those who advocated "that organized
government should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful
means,"69 appeared to pose particular problems for Chafee's social in
terest balancing methodology in speech cases. In such cases legislative
majorities had "balanced" in advance and had deemed the espousal of
a particular ideological position "subversive" to democratic institutions
and thus not contributing to the search for truth in a democracy. When
judges came to consider such legislation in light of the First Amend
ment, their characterizing the interest in freedom of expression as a so
cial interest might suggest, when a legislative enactment was over
turned, -that they were in a better position than legislatures to make
decisions about social questions. This was the very suggestion that
Progressives had deplored in decisions such as

Lochner.

Nor did the clear and present danger formula, in its marketplace
version, seem to help in cases such as

Gitlow.

When the legislature had

engaged in social interest balancing in the process of enacting a statute
restricting speech, clear and present danger appeared to be serving sim
ply as another category-based judicial formula, akin to such nineteenth-

68. See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting & Brandeis, J., concurring in dissent), ove"uled by Girourd v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States
ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 426 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Schwimmer, Holmes's dissent, joined by Brandeis, con
verted a routine deportation case into a free speech case. See WHITE, supra note 31, at
445-46.
69. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 161.2 (Matthew Bender 1909) (current version at N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.15 (McKinney 1989)).
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century rubrics as "affected with a public interest. "70 Such formulas
had served to place economic activity on one side or another of a con
stitutional boundary line; the clear and present danger formula seemed
to be doing the same for speech. If courts should be reluctant to upset
legislative determinations of whether a business was "affected with a
public interest," why should they not be equally reluctant to upset leg
islative determinations as to whether certain speech posed a clear and
present danger to the body politic?
Speech-protective theory, on confronting cases such as

Gitlow,

ap

peared to be forced in one of two directions. One direction involved re
framing the rationale of protecting speech to make clear that the mar
ketplace

of

ideas

was

not

confined

to

collective

majoritarian

preferences. In this reformulation the social interest in protecting speech
was more than simply an interest in allowing majorities freedom to de
cide what speech they wanted to protect; it was also an interest in giv
ing individual citizens in a democracy the freedom to express their
views.
An alternative direction was to reframe the rationale for protecting
speech so as to link speech more closely to the democratic model of
politics itself, and at the same time to suggest that that model was not
embodied exclusively in the outcomes produced by legislative majori
ties. In this formulation the significance of speech in a democracy was
seen more as creating an opportunity for citizens to participate in the
democratic process than as creating opportunities to speak freely as part
of a search for collective truth. Both directions were explored in free
speech commentary after
C.

Gitlow.11

Beyond the "Search for Truth" Rationale: Brandeis and the
Emergence of "Self-Governance"

In the

1927

case of

Whitney v. California,12 Justice

Brandeis wrote

a passage in a concurring opinion, joined by Holmes, that also has been
one of the most anthologized passages in twentieth-century American
constitutional law. The

Whitney

case raised the constitutionality of

Anita Whitney's conviction under a California criminal syndicalist stat
ute for attending a convention held in Oakland to create a California

70. On that fonnula and other categorist -:nineteenth-century fonnulas, see HOR
WITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 25, at 17-19.
71. Both directions are also consistent with Wiebe's observations about the in
creasingly elitist and individualistic thrust of ideas about American democracy in the
decade after World War I. See WIEBE, supra note 15, at 185-87.
72. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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chapter of the Communist Labor Party.73 In upholding Whitney's con
viction, the majority adopted a conventional police power analysis and
concluded that the state of California had a strong interest in sup
pressing the advocacy of doctrines designed to foment revolution. Al
though concurring in the result, Brandeis and Holmes declared that
Whitney had a constitutional right to associate with a political party that
advocated "the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action at
some date necessarily far in the future. "74

Ill

his concurrence Brandeis, after acting as if clear and present

danger rather than bad tendency was the Court's test for evaluating
speech claims, wrote the following:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its gov
ernment the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They
valued liberty both as an end and as a means. . . . They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indis
pensable to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . that the great
est menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a po
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. . . . Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.75

Brandeis's paragraph achieved a fusion of two sets of arguments
justifying protection for free speech. One set rehearsed the now familiar
search for truth position. The other identified freedom as both "an end"

73. The California statute prohibited any person from organizing or knowingly be
coming a member of any organization advocating "the commission of crime, sabotage
. . . or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any
political change." See 274 U.S. at 359-60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Criminal Syndicalism Act, ch. 188, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 281, 281). On its face the plat
form of the Communist Labor Party, which advocated industrial revolts and strikes,
clearly came within the statute. For general background on the Whitney case, see Vin
cent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653 (1988).
74. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Brandeis and Holmes con
curred in affirming Whitney's conviction because she had not adequately raised the free
speech issue at her trial and because, even if one assumed that she had and adopted the
clear and present danger test for evaluating her claim, "there was evidence on which
the court or jury might have found that such danger existed." 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis
& Holmes, JJ., concurring). Their decision seems quite time-bound, given the statute's
exceptionally vague and overbroad language. Whitney was only to survive as a prece
dent for about a decade.
75. 274 U.S. at 375-76 (footnote omitted).
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and "a means" and associated "freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think" with "public discussion." Notable in the passage
were referents to the discourse of modernism: a distinction between de
liberation and arbitrariness; an association of public discussion with the
power of reason; and the allusions to tyranny and to coerced silence.
The referents, however, were not contained simply in arguments on be
half of speech as furthering the social interest in the search for truth.
They also were contained in arguments on behalf of speech as part of
the process by which American citizens learned how to govern
themselves.
Much has been written on Brandeis's concurrence in

Whitney

as

marking the first impressive appearance of the self-governance rationale
in First Amendment theory.76 I am interested here in how Brandeis's in
tuitions about First Amendment jurisprudence provided an embryonic
response to the principal problems encountered by Chafee's and
Holmes's search for truth rationale as a basis for enhanced protection
for speech.
Brandeis made three assertions about the value of speech in
America in

Whitney:

that it signified a commitment to a broader ideal

of human freedom itself; that it furthered the discovery and spread of
truth; and that it fostered public discussion. But in the celebrated pas
sage from his concurrence the assertions were not treated as separable.
Freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think was linked to

political

truth; and political truth, as well as the duty of citizens to par

ticipate in government, were linked to

Whitney

public

discussion. Thus, the

concurrence can be read fairly, on a theoretical level, as sub

suming the search for truth rationale in a rationale that identified the
principal function of speech as promoting self-governance in a demo
cratic society. In addition, a fair reading of the

Whitney

concurrence is

that it enlisted all of the central premises of modernism - embodied in
the asserted value of freedom, the discovery and spread of truth, and the
power of reason - on behalf of the principle of public discussion.

If one considers these dimensions of the Brandeis concurrence in
light of the difficulties cases such as

Gitlow

posed for Chafee's formu

lation, one can see how with one stroke Brandeis was attempting to
supply a rationale for the protection of speech devoid of any lingering
overtones of late nineteenth-century libertarian orthodoxy. The rationale
for protecting speech was its extraordinary value in promoting free and

76. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 73; HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADI
TION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 156-66 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
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rational public discussion; speech as an embodiment of other liberties
was implicitly less central.
One can also see that Brandeis was attempting to modify Chafee's
analytical methodology in free speech cases. Although he retained clear
and present danger as an evaluative standard for speech claims, his

Whitney

concurrence did not mention balancing. Brandeis spoke of

courts "fix[ing] the standard by which to determine when a danger shall
be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed
present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial
to justify resort to abridgment of free speech and assembly. "77 He an
nounced that " [o]nly an emergency can justify repression" of speech,
and that " [s]uch must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with
freedom. "78
In short, Brandeis's methodology contained two sorts of categori
cal inquiries. At the level of doctrine, judges were to employ a fixed
standard for interpreting the clear and present danger formula, and cate
gorize cases as involving or not involving emergencies. More signifi
cantly, at the level of normative theory, judges were to categorize
speech claims as related, or unrelated, to public discussion. To make the
implications of the latter characterization

Whitney

clear, Brandeis

said

in

that " [t]he power of the courts to strike down an offending

law" was "no less" in cases implicating "the fundamental personal
rights of free speech and assembly" than in cases "where the denial of
liberty involved was that of engaging in a particular business. "79 As we
shall come to see, by "no less," in fact, he meant "greater. "
The categorist dimensions of Brandeis's methodology in

Whitney

suggest that he intended to turn late nineteenth-century orthodox juris
prudence on its head. Instead of subsuming protection for personal lib
erties in a line of arguments associated with police power property
rights cases, he attempted to subsume protection for personal liberties in
arguments generated by the concept of political self-governance. Bran
deis, in short, used First Amendment cases to launch the project of bi
furcated constitutional review. Speech rights were to be given

greater

protection against legislative infringement than property rights because

77. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Later in his Whitney con
currence Brandeis suggested that the standard should be a very speech-protective read
ing of the phrase "clear and present danger," permitting legislative repressions of
speech only when the speech posed "imminent danger" creating "the probability of se
rious injury to the state." 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
78. 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
79. 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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speech was more closely connected than economic activity to the pro
cess of self-governance in a democracy.

m.

THE · 'PREFERRED PosrrmN' ' INTERLUDE

Free Speech Cases and the Bifurcated Review Project

A.

Commentators on twentieth-century constitutional history have ac
knowledged the existence of the bifurcated review project but have
tended to locate its origins in the political and economic transformations
that eventually ushered in a much greater regulatory presence for the
federal government after the 1932 election.80 This article has maintained
that the project originated earlier, first with Chafee's effort to disassoci
ate protection for speech from the late nineteenth-century legacy of ar
guments on behalf of economic liberties, and then with Brandeis's re
formulation of Chafee's rationale for the protection of speech in

Whitney.

Most commentary, however, identifies the origins of bifur

cated review with two developments in constitutional jurisprudence in
the late 1930s.
One development was the appearance of First Amendment opin
ions suggesting that the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion oc
cupied a "preferred position" in constitutional jurisprudence and in
American culture. Despite the frequent allusions to preferred position
cases in commentary, the cases themselves have received relatively lit
tle attention.81 The other development was then-Justice Stone's afore
mentioned

Carolene Products footnote,

in which he suggested that there

might be more searching judicial review of legislative activity when a
statute affected rights explicitly mentioned in the text of the Constitu
tion or when it was directed at "discrete and insular minorities" whose
status adversely affected their influence in the legislative forum.8 2
The major impact of the

Carolene Products

footnote has been in

equal protection jurisprudence, but it should be understood that the first
paragraph of the footnote, with its attention to textually protected rights,
provides a justification for a higher level of judicial scrutiny for First
Amendment claims than for legislative infringements on

Lochner-type

80. See, e.g., PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 19181969, at 172-75 (1972).
81. The preferred position cases have received slightly more attention from politi
cal scientists and constitutional historians. A recent treatment is Howard Gillman, Pre

ferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern
Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 41 POL REs. Q. 623 (1994).
82. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
.
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rights. 83 Modern commentators have tended not to concentrate on this
paragraph.84

It has been simple enough for commentators to conclude that the
expansion of government in the 1 930s precipitated a recognition of the
potential of government to infringe upon noneconomic rights. The
emergence around the time of the New Deal of preferred position
cases,85 and of the two-tiered theory of judicial review suggested in

Carolene Products,
tions

on

the

has been seen as a natural consequence of reflec

intrusive

potential

of

an

expanded

governmental

apparatus.86

83. The paragraph reads: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." 304 U.S. at
152 n.4. First Amendment cases were clearly the model for this paragraph. It was fol
lowed by a citation to Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931), and to
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938), in each of which the Court unanimously in
validated a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution of circulars or any other
literature without a permit from the city manager. Moreover, correspondence between
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Stone over an earlier draft of the Carolene
Products footnote centered on ways to distinguish First Amendment cases from other
"liberty" cases. See Letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 18,
1 933), quoted in WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTER
PRETATION 487 (1986); Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Charles Evans Hughes (Apr.
19, 1938), quoted in MURPHY ET AL., supra, at 488.
84. The following statement, from a constitutional casebook jointly authored by
two political scientists and a law professor, represents the conventional view of the rela
tionship of the Carotene Products footnote to the bifurcated review project
The timing of the footnote is important. For much of the previous fifty
years, a majority of the justices . . . had read their economic views into and out
of the Constitution so as to thwart both state and federal efforts to cope with the
problems of industrial and finance capitalism. The Great Depression that en
veloped the country in 1929 and the Court's war against Roosevelt's New Deal
had left laissez faire - and the nation - in shambles. By 1938, the Court had
retreated, saying it would presume economic regulation to be constitutional. This
withdrawal . . . raised fundamental questions about the future of constitutional in
terpretations by judges. If they were to presume economic regulation constitu
tional, why not all regulation? On what principles could they draw lines?
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 83, at 473. Professor Fleming, currently on the faculty of
Fordham Law School, was in private practice at the time the casebook was issued.
85. The term "preferred position case" refers simply to any case in which an
opinion of the Court used language either openly declaring that First Amendment rights
occupied a preferred position or stating that such rights should receive greater judicial
solicitude because of the fundamental nature of speech rights or the "indispensable con
nection" between speech rights and democratic theory. As will become evident, the pre
cise constitutional meaning of preferred position was never fully clarified in the
decisions.
86. See, e.g., Gillman, supra note 81, at 645-46.
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The difficulty with seeing the preferred position interlude in First
Amendment jurisprudence as part of a natural response to the emer
gence of expanded government in the twentieth century is that such an
explanation supplies no intellectual basis for why a group of judges and
jurists should have responded to expanded government by bifurcating
constitutional review. The logic of the

Lochner

critique, we have seen,

led in the direction of less judicial activism on behalf of legislatively
regulated liberties, whatever their content. Moreover, the civil rights
movement, with its enhanced consciousness of the oppressed status of
minorities in America, was hardly a mainstream phenomenon in the late
1930s.87 Thus there does not appear to be any obvious explanation for
why Justices, such as Brandeis and those who can be identified with the
brief development of preferred position free speech jurisprudence,
should have concluded that although governmental restrictions on Loch

ner-type

rights were now presumptively rational, governmental restric

tions on noneconomic rights needed to be scrutinized carefully.
There is, however, an explanation for the emergence of bifurcated
review that can be grounded in the language of the preferred position
cases themselves. That explanation begins with an understanding that
from Brandeis's 1927 concurrence in
interval in which the

Whitney

Lochner majority's

until 1942, the very time

approach to due process cases

was rejected88 and the Court increasingly sanctioned an expansion of
congressional and state power to regulate the economy,89 every Su
preme Court case exhibiting an increased level of scrutiny of a legisla
tive regulation was a First Amendment case.90 Moreover, many of those
cases openly suggested that First Amendment rights should receive
greater judicial solicitude than other rights: that was what "preferred
position" meant.
Finally, the cases that did assign First Amendment rights to a pre
ferred position posited an explanation for their being singled out. The
explanation was not fully developed: it often consisted, in fact, of a sin
gle rhetorical assertion. But that assertion was nonetheless of real sig
nificance in the twentieth-century history of free speech. It proclaimed
an "indispensable connection" between free speech and the meaning of

87. See Klarman, supra note 5, at 26-27.
88. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937).
89. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
90. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 3 1 6 U.S. 535 (1942), marks the first
instance of a majority of the Court adopting heightened scrutiny in a non-First Amend
ment case. It involved a compulsory sterilization law that the Court invalidated on a
combination of due process and equal protection grounds.
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democracy in America. The preferred position cases decided by the Su
preme Court, beginning in 1937, reveal intuitions by several Justices,
with Brandeis, that First Amendment rights were in a different category
from other constitutional liberties and deserved greater constitutional
protection than police power analysis afforded them. Those Justices in
tuitively concluded that the reason for this enhanced protection for First
Amendment rights lay not only in the close connections between free
speech and democratic theory, but in the enhanced significance of dem
ocratic theory itself as a defining aspirational feature of American
civilization.
B.

The Preferred Position Cases: Intuitions About Cognitive Freedom
and Democracy
By the late 1930s the Court's First Amendment decisions showed

signs of abandoning the legacy of police power liberty analysis, which
the Court also had begun to modify significantly in economic liberty
cases,91 and of reaching more speech-protective results.92 The question
remained, however, as to why the now enlightened posture of judicial
deference to reasonable legislative restrictions on economic activity
should not also apply to restrictions on speech. If bifurcated review was
to take place, on what basis could it be justified?
The preferred position interlude in the twentieth-century intellec
tual history of free speech in America consisted of efforts by several
Justices to offer versions of the idea that First Amendment rights occu
pied a special constitutional and cultural place in America because of
their intimate connection to the idea of democracy. As a doctrinal de
velopment, the preferred position interlude was cryptic and abortive.
Between 1937 and the early 1950s various Justices on the Court de
clared openly or implied that First Amendment rights occupied a pre
ferred position. Their scattered remarks, although invoked by majority
opinions in subsequent cases, neither clarified the precise doctrinal

9 1 . Compare West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379 with Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400.
92. In a series of cases between Whitney in 1927 and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937), the Court began to reach more speech-protective results and to supplant its
bad tendency test in subversive advocacy contexts with a clear and present danger test.
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), continued to employ police power analysis and
the bad tendency formula. But De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), and Herndon
invalidated convictions under criminal-syndicalist statutes under circumstances where a
bad tendency analysis would have sustained them. Meanwhile Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931), and Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), repre
sented the first two instances in which the Court had openly invalidated a state statute
on First Amendment grounds.
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meaning of "preferred position" nor provided any extended justifica
tion for why freedom of speech, religion, and assembly should be given
preferred status. Eventually the Court implicitly abandoned the phrase
"preferred position" altogether and explored other interpretive tech
niques for carving out a high degree of protection for speech.
But the episode, coming at the time it did, aptly illustrated the
search for a bifurcated standard of constitutional review that lay at the
heart of the Court's jurisprudential enterprise by the late 1930s. The
preferred position sequence of cases represented an attempt by the
Court to enshrine the modernist premise of cognitive freedom and to as
sociate that premise with a powerfully evocative theme that surfaced for
Americans in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century the theme of America as a democratic society. Beginning in the 1 930s
and stretching through the years of the Second World War, the idea of
America as a democracy dramatically expanded its cultural meaning,
signifying not only a society based on freedom, but a society opposed
to tyranny and arbitrariness; an antitotalitarian society that represented
the world's last best hope for rationality and truth.93
Free speech, in the preferred position episode, became democratic
speech. It became closely associated with the intertwined ideas of crea
tive self-fulfillment (freedom

from

to

express oneself) and equality (freedom

discrimination or oppression.) Those ideas were taken to be at the

foundation of America as a democratic society. Free democratic speech
in modernist parlance signified the power of the human actor, liberated
from the dominance of external forces, free to determine his or her indi
vidual destiny, required only to respect the freedoms of others.
Modernist conceptions of freedom suggested that free democratic
speech was unlike the other liberties in orthodox nineteenth-century ju93. Wiebe argues that in this period "the state," personified by the decisions of
expert policymakers, decisively replaced "the People" as "democracy's last resort."
See WIEBE, supra note 15, at 202. He also suggests that the elitist and individualistic
emphasis of democratic theory continued in this period. These developments, taken to
gether, facilitated the role of institutions of the national government, including the Su
preme Court, in fashioning "democratic rights" for individual citizens. See id. at 220,
225-26.
I agree that the period from the early 1930s through the Second World War was
one in which the Justices on the Court increasingly came to regard themselves as guard
ians, and arguably creators, of free speech rights. Assumptions that democratic theory
was implemented best by elites, and realized most effectively through the expansion of
individual rather than collective rights, might have contributed to that development. But
I think a more obvious motivation for Justices to forge an explicit link between free
speech and democracy in the 1 930s and 1940s rested in their awareness that in many
other nations the expansion of state power was being associated with totalitarian re
gimes that repressed speech. American "democracy" for them had powerfully antitotal
itarian overtones.
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risprudence. Such liberties had come to be associated with the undemo
cratic economic excesses that had rewarded the rich at the expense of
the poor and caused the Depression. The free speech ideal did not pro
tect rights associated with material possessions but instead shielded
rights embodied in the ideal of democracy.
The sequence of preferred position cases started in a decision in
which the phrase itself was not employed, but in which the theme of
democratic speech surfaced. In
before the

Carolene Products

Palko v. Connecticut,94

decided a year

footnote, Justice Cardozo, for the Court,

defined free speech as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom. " "Liberty" in America, he con
cluded, "has been enlarged . . . to include liberty of the mind as well as
liberty of action. "95 It is not clear by those remarks whether Cardozo
meant to suggest that free speech rights, by being a "matrix" of other
rights, were preferred over all other constitutional guarantees. But Palko
was a case in which he searched for Bill of Rights freedoms that were
"of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty," so that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. "96 " [F]reedom of
thought[] and speech" was first on his list.97
Between

Palko and the close

of the Second World War the Court's

free speech cases regularly involved challenges to state and municipal
regulations by members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect. Many Witness
sects believed that the Old Testament's First Commandment, forbidding
the worshipping of any graven image, prevented them from participat
ing in flag-salute ceremonies. They were thus the petitioners in one of
the Court's most celebrated sequence of decisions, Minersville School
District v. Gobitis98 and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar
nette,99 in which the Justices reversed themselves on the constitutional
ity of compulsory flag-salute laws, and overruled an opinion that had
been rendered only three years previously and had engendered only one
dissent. The flag-salute cases also can be shown to have been the basis
for an eventual critique of the preferred position rationale by Justice Fe

lix Frankfurter, who initially had identified himself with that rationale.

94. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
95. Palko, 302 U.S. at 327 (citing Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HAR.v. L. REv. 431 (1926)). The Court unanimously and
without elaboration decided to incorporate the First Amendment against the states in

Git/ow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
96. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26.
97. 302 U.S. at 326.
98. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Vrrginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
99. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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As early as 1939 Jehovah's Witnesses cases began to invoke judi
cial declarations that speech rights should be given special solicitude. In

Schneider

v.

Irvington

Justice Roberts, for each member of the Court

save McReynolds, conceptualized an antilittering ordinance directed
against the distribution of Witness literature as pitting the "duty" of
municipalities "to keep their communities' streets open and available
for movement of people and property" against "the guarantee of free
dom of speech or of the press." 1 00 In such cases the judicial task was
"to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of
the rights." 1 01 Roberts made it clear what would weigh most heavily in
the balancing:
This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the
press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. . . .
. . . [L]egislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activ
ities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the existence of

rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. 102

Not only were First Amendment freedoms indispensable and fundamen
tal, they had been linked explicitly to the ideal of democracy.
A year after Schneider the first of the flag-salute cases was handed
down, and the idea of democratic speech greatly expanded in cultural
significance and revealed itself as containing some internal ambiguities.
Both Frankfurter's majority opinion, sustaining the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania school district's practice of opening each day in its public
schools with a mandatory ceremony paying homage to the American
flag, and Stone's dissent, finding the practice a violation of the religious
freedom of Jehovah's Witnesses families who objected to the practice,
attempted to justify their positions through invocations of the indispen
sable connection between freedom and democracy. Frankfurter asserted
that "personal freedom is best maintained - so long as the remedial
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed when it is . . . not enforced against popular policy by the coercion of
adjudicated law." 1 03 Stone countered that:
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the people
that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs. It is also an ex
pression of faith and a command that freedom of mind and spirit must be

100.
101.
102.
103.

Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
308 U.S. at 161.
308 U.S. at 161.
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (footnote omitted).
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preserved, which government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice
and moderation without which no free government can exist. 104

The Frankfurter-Stone exchange suggested that the ideal of democ
racy could be translated into support for majoritarian, popular policies
restricting speech as well as support for an individual's speech rights as
the embodiment of freedom. As the Court developed those alternative
conceptions of speech and democracy, it continued to review Jehovah's
Witnesses cases, many involving municipal regulations on the distribu
tion of leaflets.105 But the stakes involved in carving out special judicial
protection for speech, at least within the Court, had been elevated.
In the 1 942 case of Jones

v. Opelika,

a 5-4 majority of the Court

upheld municipal license fees directed against Witness pamphlets by
characterizing the distributions as commercial transactions, and thus not
implicating speech rights, and the fees as reasonable restraints on eco
nomic activity. In his dissent Stone was not content simply to challenge
the majority's characterizations of the municipal regulations. He an
nounced that:
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of
speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe
them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the
Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position.
Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege
is sought out for attack. They extend . . . to every form of taxation
which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capa

ble of being used to control or suppress it. 106

Stone's dissent in

Opelika

made it clear that the "speech dimen

sions" of the leaflets were what conveyed special protection on those
who distributed them. By "preferred position" he meant that "every
form of taxation" and other economic regulation that could be seen as
infringing First Amendment rights would receive heightened judicial
scrutiny. When one combines this categorization of preferred position
rights with the original rationale for giving those rights special attention
- their indispensable connection to the maintenance of democratic
principles - it became clear that Stone was suggesting that speech

104. 310 U.S. at 606-07 (Stone, J., dissenting).
105. Between 1938 and 1946 the Court considered six such cases. See Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (deciding
a conglomerate of several comparable cases); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Of these cases all but Lovell pro
duced rhetoric identifying First Amendment rights as occupying a "preferred position."
See infra text accompanying notes 106-12.
106. Opelika, 316 U.S. at 608 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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rights reinforced democracy in a way that economic rights did not. This
suggestion expanded the cultura1 significance of democracy in America
during a period of tota1itarian cha1lenges and made speech rights the ex
emplar for bifurcated review in a post Lochner constitutiona1 universe.
-

This reading of Stone's dissent in

Opelika

is supported by an unu

sua1 memorandum issued in the case by Justices Murphy, Black, and
Douglas, all of whom had joined Stone's dissent. In that memorandum
the three Justices stated that " [t]he opinion of the Court sanctions a de
vice which in our opinion suppresses or tends to suppress the free exer
cise of a religion practiced by a minority group." 1 07 They then an
nounced that they had changed their mind about the Court's decision in

Gobitis,

which they had each joined (this despite the fact that

Opelika

had nothing to do with compulsory flag sa1utes). The reason they gave
for changing their minds about the constitutiona1 status of religious
based challenges to compulsory flag sa1ute laws was that "our demo
cratic form of government, functioning under the historic Bill of Rights,
has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the religious views of
minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox those views be." 108
A personnel change on the Court provided additiona1 momentum
to the theory that free speech rights should occupy a preferred position
in a democracy.

Murdock v. Pennsylvania,109

another Jehovah's Wit

nesses license case handed down a little over a year later, vacated

Ope

lika

and inva1idated all municipa1ly imposed "flat taxes" on the distri
bution of religious literature. 1 10 Douglas, for the majority in Murdock,
declared that " [f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of relig
ion are in a preferred position." 1 1 1 The context of his statement made it
clear that he meant "preferred" to refer to a distinction between speech
and commercia1 activity. "A license tax," he argued, "certainly does
not acquire constitutiona1 va1idity because it classifies the privileges

107. 316 U.S. at 623 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
108. 316 U.S. at 624 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). This allegedly left Roberts, Reed,
Byrnes, and Jackson as continuing to adhere to Frankfurter's Gobitis opinion, but
Byrnes and Jackson had not been on the Court for Gobitis, so Frankfurter hardly could
regard them as firm adherents.
109. 319 U.S. 105 (1942). Frankfurter protested against the Court's grant of certio
rari in Murdock, which was virtually on all fours with Jones v. Opelika. See H N
HmscH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 166 (1981).
1 10. The majority in Murdock consisted of the four dissenters in Opelika plus
newly appointed Justice Wiley Rutledge, who had replaced James Byrnes in the 1942
Term. The remaining members of the majority in Opelika, Frankfurter, Roberts, Reed,
and Jackson, three of whom had joined the majority opinion in Gobitis, dissented.
1 1 1 . Murdock, 319 U.S. at 1 15.
.

.
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protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchan
dise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike." 1 1 2
Thus by 1943 Jehovah's Witnesses cases had given the Court an
opportunity to formulate a distinction reminiscent of that made by
Chafee: religious speech was specially protected, but commercial activ
ity, including speech proposing a commercial transaction, was not.113
The Court now returned to the issue of compulsory flag salutes, as the
national counsel for the Witnesses challenged a policy imposed by the
West Virginia Board of Education on all state public schools.114 After
conference Stone knew that he had a clear majority to overrule

Gobi

tis115 and assigned the opinion to Jackson. Frankfurter was comparably
aware that his position, which once had commanded the votes of eight
Justices, now, three years later, commanded the votes of only three. As
the opinions in the second flag salute case unfolded, it was apparent
that two themes were on the Justices' minds: the "indispensable" con
nection between free speech and democratic theory and the jurispruden
tial implications of conferring a preferred position on speech rights.
Jackson's opinion for the Court, after noting that " [t]hose who be
gin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters," announced that "the First Amendment . . . was designed to
avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings. . . . We set up govern-

1 12. 319 U.S. at 1 15.
1 13. The Court specifically had excluded commercial speech from First Amend
ment protection in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
One could even suggest that Jehovah's Witnesses cases had stimulated the Court to
make even more fundamental distinctions about speech. In Chaplinsky v. New Hamp
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), Justice Murphy, for a unanimous Court, attempted to define
the content of constitutionally protected free speech rights. He excluded from First
Amendment protection
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . . These include
the lewd and the obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting
words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. . . . [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter
est in order and morality.
315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnote omitted). The petitioner in Chaplinsky was a Jehovah's
Witness distributing sect literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire when he
was accused of calling a city marshal " 'a God damned racketeer' " and a " 'damned
Fascist' " 315 U.S. at 569.
1 14. See West Vrrginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 1 9 U.S. 624 (1943).
1 15. The Gobitis majority, in addition to Frankfurter, had consisted of Chief Jus
tice Hughes and Justices McReynolds, Roberts, Black, Reed, Douglas, and Murphy.
Black, Douglas, and Murphy had signaled their desertion in Opelika, Hughes's and Mc
Reynolds's seats were now occupied by Stone himself and Rutledge, and Robert Jack
son had succeeded to Stone's seat
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ment by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in
power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent." 1 1 6 Having identi
fied the First Amendment as embodying an antitotalitarian ethos, he
then turned to the implications of treating the Constitution as withdraw
ing "certain subjects," in which "fundamental rights" such as "free
speech" and "freedom of worship" were implicated, "from the vicissi
tudes of political controversy. " 1 17 He listed among "fundamental"
rights "liberty" and "property." 1 1 8 Did this mean that bifurcated review
was unintelligible, or that

Lochner was

revived?

Jackson made it clear that the preferred position experiment would
continue:
[I]t is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles
of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake. . . . Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears
when the specific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right
of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so
far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all the restric
tions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not
be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State
may lawfully prevent.119

Jackson's doctrinal conclusion was unmistakable: when First Amend
ment rights were involved, the rational basis standard for evaluating the
constitutionality of legislation now would have to yield to a version of
Holmes' and Brandeis' clear and present danger test.
Perhaps stung by the invocation of Holmes and Brandeis against
his majority opinion in

Gobitis,

Frankfurter's dissent immediately took

up the question of whether a preferred position for speech rights was
necessary once one concluded that free speech bore an "indispensable"
connection to democratic theory. His answer was that placing speech
rights in a preferred position was not only unnecessary, but dangerous:
The Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing with
one phase of "liberty" than with another . . . . Judicial self-restraint is
equally necessary whenever an exercise of political or legislative power
is challenged.

.

. . Our power does not vary according to the particular

provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked. The right not to have
property taken without just compensation has, so far as the scope of judi-

1 16.
1 17.
1 18.
1 19.

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
319 U.S. at 638.
See 319 U.S. at 638.
319 U.S. at 639.
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cial power is concerned, the same constitutional dignity as
of the press or freedom of speech or religious freedom. 120

Frankfurter's dissent in

Barnette

.

•

.

freedom

was part of an intense and ulti

mately painful flirtation he had undertaken in the 1 930s and 1940s with
the preferred position experiment and bifurcated review. In 1938, after
reading Stone's

Carolene Products

footnote, Frankfurter wrote Stone

that he had just finished a series of lectures on Holmes in which he
"tried to reconcile [Holmes's] latitudinarian attitude toward constitu
tionality in cases other than civil liberties . . . with his attitude in civil
liberties cases" ; Frankfurter stated that he "was especially excited by
[Stone's] note 4," which "is extremely suggestive and opens up new
territory." 1 21 In his lectures on Holmes, Frankfurter had concluded that
"the liberty of man to search for truth was of a different order than
some economic dogma," and "therefore, Mr. Justice Holmes attributed
very different legal significance to those liberties of the individual
which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of a free soci
ety from that which he attached to liberties which derived merely from

shifting economic arrangements.'' 122

Two years later Frankfurter was on the Court writing the majority
opinion in

Gobitis,

and he wrote Stone, after the latter had circulated a

draft dissent, that "I am aware of the important distinction which you
skillfully adumbrated in your footnote four . . . in the

ucts Co.

Carolene Prod

case. I agree with that distinction; I regard it as basic. " 123 And

as late as 1941 he was prepared to declare, for the Court, that judges
should approach efforts to restrict freedom of discussion in labor dis
putes "with a jealous eye," and to cite footnote four in
ucts for that proposition. 124

Carolene Prod

Gobitis

letter, about his

But Frankfurter had also told Stone, in his

"anxiety that, while we lean in the direction of the libertarian aspect,

120. 319 U.S. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 27, 1 938) (on file
with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in MURPHY ET AL.,
supra note 83, at 491 . The letter provides additional evidence that the bifurcated review
project, in inchoate form, had begun with the emergence of modernist free speech juris
prudence after World War I. Frankfurter's reference to Holmes's non-"latitudinarian"
attitude in "civil liberties" cases could only have meant free speech cases, since
Holmes was deferential to legislatures in all other cases. See WHITE, supra note 31, at
377-409.
122. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT
75-76 (2d ed. 1961).
123. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone (May 27, 1940) (on file
with the Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in HIRSCH, supra
note 109, at 151.
124. See American Fedn. of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325 (1941).
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we do not exercise our judicial power unduly . . . . In other words, I
want to avoid the mistake comparable to that made by those whom we
criticized when dealing with the control of property." 125 And after being
humiliated in the flag salute sequence, 126 he signaled that any inclina
tion he had had to endorse the preferred position experiment had been
withdrawn. Eventually, after Stone died in 1946, Frankfurter decided to
mount an open attack on the preferred position rubric itself.
The case was

Kovacs v. Cooper,127 a

1949 decision in which a plu

rality of the Court sustained a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance prohibit
ing the use of sound trucks that issued "loud and raucous noises." In

Kovacs, Justice Reed, for a plurality that included Justices Vmson and
Burton, endorsed what he called " [t]he preferred position of freedom of
speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all," 128 but found that the
state interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of its citizens
overrode the First Amendment claim.1 29 Frankfurter and Jackson con
curred in the result in Kovacs, with Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy dissenting.

·

In his concurring opinion Frankfurter launched an attack on the

preferred position rubric. He called " 'preferred position' " a "mischie
vous phrase" that had "uncritically crept into some recent opinions of
this Court." 130 He then set forth a history of preferred position, includ
ing not only cases in which the characterization was explicitly used, but
cases in which he concluded that the Court was adhering to a bifurcated
standard of review. The result of this historical exegesis, for Frank
furter, was that "the claim that any legislation is presumptively uncon
stitutional which touches the field of the First Amendment . . . has
never commended itself to a majority of this Court." 131 He then con
cluded with an extraordinary sentence:
[I]n considering what interests are so fundamental as to be enshrined in
the Due Process Clause, those liberties of the individual which history
has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a
closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting eco
nomic arrangements. 1 32

125.
126.
tenure on
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone, supra note 123, at 151.
For evidence that the flag salute cases were a pivotal episode in Frankfurter's
the Supreme Court, see HIRSCH, supra note 109, at 176-77, 2 1 1 .
336 U.S. 7 7 (1949) (plurality opinion).
336 U.S. at 88 (plurality opinion).
See 336 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion).
336 U.S. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
336 U.S. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
336 U.S. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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This was, of course, an almost verbatim paragraph of the characteriza
tion of Holmes's jurisprudence that he had made in 1938, in the course
of an argument that "the liberty of man to search for truth was of a dif
ferent order than some economic dogma defined as a sacred right. " 133
Frankfurter's tortured and ambivalent reaction to the preferred po
sition rubric, and to the bifurcated review project itself, underscores
once again the pivotal role of speech rights in launching that project.
The passage quoted above from his

Kovacs

concurrence suggests that

Frankfurter had internalized the central assumption of the preferred po
sition cases, that speech rights could be distinguished from rights de
rived "merely from shifting economic arrangements" because of their
indispensable connection to an open, democratic society. 1 34 In that pas
sage Frankfurter signaled his tacit acceptance of the bifurcated review
project while apparently protesting against it. Rutledge, dissenting in

Kovacs,

observed that Frankfurter's excursus had "demonstrate[d] the

conclusion opposite to that which he draws, namely, that the First
Amendment guaranties . . . occupy preferred position not only in the
Bill of Rights but also in the repeated decisions of this Court. " 135
There is no direct evidence about the reaction of any of Frank
furter's other colleagues to his attack on the preferred position concept
in

Kovacs,

but the phrase "preferred position" virtually disappeared

from the Court's free speech cases, showing up only once more in a
throwaway line by Douglas in a 1953 case. 1 36 The short life of the pre
ferred position rubric, however, concealed its significance as an impor
tant transition phase in the twentieth-century intellectual history of First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Both Chafee and Brandeis had hinted, but not explicitly suggested,
that the search for truth and self-governance rationales for the protec
tion of speech were associated with the training of citizens to make in
formed and intelligent decisions about questions of public concern. Al
though their formulations can be read as seeking to channel the freedom
to learn about and to discuss public issues along paths consistent with
the constraints of rationalism and empiricism, they had not indicated
that all of the central premises of modernist consciousness were re
flected in democratic theory and a model of democratic politics. They
had not, in other words, explicitly suggested that the speech being pro-

133. FRANKFURTER, supra note 122, at 75.
134. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
135. 336 U.S. at 106 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
136. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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tected by the First Amendment was speech furthering the ideals of a
democracy.
By openly identifying the basis of special constitutional protection
for speech as the indispensable connection between free expression and
democratic theory, and at the same time distinguishing between speech
and liberties deriving from shifting economic arrangements, the pre
ferred position cases sought both to link free speech with the idea of
America as a democratic society and to disengage protection for eco
nomic liberties from that idea. "Preferred position" meant a preference
for First Amendment freedom as having a particularly close association
with the model of democratic politics that had surfaced in modem
American society. It also meant, implicitly, that the freedoms associated
with an economic model of unregulated capitalism were less democratic
and hence less preferred. Liberties derived from "shifting economic ar
rangements" were taken to be less indispensable conditions of an
"open" society.
There were, as the flag salute cases suggested, some difficulties
with grounding a preferred position for speech rights in the expanded
meaning of America as a democratic society. These lay in the tension
between democratic theory as bolstering freedom of expression and
democratic theory as being embodied in majoritarian policymaking. If a
justification for legislative regulation of economic activity was that leg
islatures, being representative of the majority of citizens, were appropri
ate institutions to make policies affecting the distribution of benefits in
the economic marketplace, why were they not equally appropriate insti
tutions to determine the forms of expression that a majority wanted to
restrict as well as protect? Yet the very cases announcing that First
Amendment rights were to be placed in a preferred position because of
the close connection between free speech and the ideal of democracy
were cases in which legislatures, on behalf of their majoritarian constit
uency, had restricted speech.
Thus it appeared that a further particularization of what types of
speech were indispensable to a democratic society, and which were not,
might be required. This was especially true if one were inclined to grant
Chafee's premise that humans tended to react rationally to economic is
sues but subjectively and irrationally to speech issues. Although a dem
ocratic model of politics

suggested that policymaking

should be

majoritarian, Chafee's premise suggested that majorities were likely to
suppress, perhaps even oversuppress, provocative speech. How did one
determine which speech was presumptively immune from suppression?
The rhetorical basis of the preferred position cases suggested an answer.
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that speech which itself could be said to be indispensable to the func
tioning of democratic politics.137
In a search for indispensable, democratic speech, neither the search
for truth formulation nor its accompanying metaphor of a constantly ex
panding marketplace of ideas seemed to provide much guidance. Let
ting more speech into the market did not clarify which expressions a
majority could and could not suppress consistent with the ideal of de
mocracy. It was not particularly surprising, then, that the first significant
contribution to twentieth-century free speech jurisprudence to appear af
ter the preferred position interlude was one that attempted to disassoci
ate protection for speech from the "marketplace of ideas" and at the
same time to refine the meaning of "democratic, " protected speech.
IV.

THE MEIKLEJOHN INTERPRETATION, "PuBLIC SPEECH," AND
THE PROGRESSION TO ABSOLUTISM
A.

The Doctrinal and Cultural Setting

While the preferred position formulation was being experimented
with in free speech cases from the late 1930s to the early 1950s, an
other doctrinal development took place in the area in which speech
protective theories of the First Amendment had initially surfaced subversive advocacy. By the 1940s free speech cases were beginning to
group themselves loosely in three distinct areas: nonsubversive cases
with a labor setting, such as

Thomas v. Collins;138

cases involving ef

forts on the part of a religious minority to disseminate its views, such as
the numerous cases in which Jehovah's Witnesses were plaintiffs; and a
continuing line of subversive activity cases, such as

Lowry139

and

De Jonge v. Oregon, 140

Herndon v.

which after the early 1940s were

reviewed using the clear and present danger test.
This last set of free speech cases came to be affected by the ideo
logical confrontation between an expanded Soviet Union, with its asso
ciated bloc of communist-dominated regimes in eastern Europe, and the
United States and nations in western Europe whose governments were
modeled on democratic rather than totalitarian theories of political or137. One could argue that at the very time that several justices on the Court were
demonstrating an enthusiasm for the preferred position rubric, they also implicitly were
exploring distinctions between "protected" and "unprotected" forms of speech in cases
such as Chaplinsky, Valentine v. Chrestensen, and the Jehovah's Witnesses leafletting
cases. In such cases an implicit hierarchy of "higher" and "lower value" expression
appeared to be forming, although the Court did not characterize it as such.
138. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
139. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
140. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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ganization. Communist states replaced the defeated fascist regimes as
the principal form of world government rejecting a democratic model of
politics.
Some of the aims of international communism, when identified
with communists or communist sympathizers in America, arguably gave
a potentially new meaning to "subversion" in subversive advocacy
cases. Among the stated goals of international communism was the sys
tematic delegitimation and destruction of "bourgeois" governments that
oppressed the people. These goals, encapsulated in the phrase "over
throw the government of the United States," were taken, given the im
mediate past history of imperialist totalitarian regimes, as directly hos
tile to America, and efforts were made to deny legal status to the
American Communist Party as a threat to national security. The per
ceived danger created by international communism also gave a revived
meaning to provisions in the 1940 Smith Act, enacted by Congress after
war had broken out in Europe, 141 which made it unlawful for any person
"to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, ne
cessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any
government in the United States." 142
The constitutional culmination of these developments was the Su
preme Court's interpretation of the clear and present danger standard for
evaluating subversive advocacy in the 1951 case of

States. 1 43

In

Dennis,

Dennis

v.

United

Chief Justice Vinson restated the standard as

"whether the gravity of the ' evil,' discounted by its improbability, justi
fies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger," 144
and applied it to sustain a conviction under the Smith Act against
eleven leaders of the Communist Party of the United States for conspir
ing to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government. There was no
evidence in

Dennis

that the defendants actually had participated in any

141. The Smith Act's formal title was the Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat.
670 (1940) (repealed 1952). See generally MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD wAR POLITI
CAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1977).
142. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, § 2(a)(l), 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (repealed
1952).
143. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
1 44. 341 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Vinson
was quoting Learned Hand's rephrasing of the clear and present danger standard in
Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). Gerald Gunther has argued
that although Hand's rephrased test "diluted the most speech-protective interpretations"
of clear and present danger, Hand did not do so out of a desire to reduce the level of
protection for "subversive" speech but because he had long been frustrated with the
vagueness of the test. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE
JUDGE 599-600 (1994).
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acts of subversive activity or had advocated such acts. The Court sim
ply took judicial notice of their collective organization, the ideological
tenets of international communism, and the political pressure being
placed on non-communist regimes in Western Europe in the aftermath
of the Second World War.145
B.

The Meiklejohn Interpretation

Three years before the

Dennis

decision Alexander Meiklejohn,

then the President of Amherst College, had published a book,

Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government. 146

In

his

Free

preface

Meiklejohn stated that the book was prompted by two concerns: his
sense that the U.S. government was moving on a number of fronts to
suppress "dangerous" speech, 147 and his conviction that the Supreme
Court's clear and present danger test for evaluating such efforts at sup
pression was inadequate.148
Meiklejohn's particularistic motivations for writing

Free Speech

were clear enough, but the strategy he employed in formulating his the
oretical position suggested that he was reacting to a larger jurispruden
tial concern. The "most general thesis" of his argument, he announced
in his first chapter, "is . . . that our civil liberties, in general, are not all
of one kind. They are of two kinds which, though radically different in
constitutional status, are easily confused. . . . One of these is open to re
striction by the government. The other is not open to such restric
tion. " 149 As examples Meiklejohn offered the liberty "of religious or ir
religious belief," which "the government is unqualifiedly forbidden to
restrict," and "the liberty of an individual to own, and to use the in
come from, his labor or his property," which was " a limited one,"
"open to restriction by the government." 150

145. See GUNTHER, supra note 144, at 601-02.
146. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF
GOVERNMENT (1948).
147. Meiklejohn cited the FBI's gathering of the "opinions" of "hundreds of
thousands of our people" in its files, the House Un-American Activities Committee's
investigations, the Department of Justice's listing of allegedly "disloyal" organizations,
an Executive Order directed at establishing tests for "loyalty," and an order issued by
the Attorney General that would restrict the opportunities of certain classes of aliens "to
engage in public discussion of public policy." See id. at x-xiii.
148. Meiklejohn began his discussion of the clear and present danger test by as
serting that it "annuls the most significant purpose of the First Amendment" and "de
stroys the intellectual basis of our plan of self-government." Id. at 29.
149. Id. at 1-2.

150. Id.
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Meiklejohn located the constitutional source of these two types of
liberties in the juxtaposition of the First and Fifth Amendments. The
First flatly prohibited the abridgement of freedom of speech. The Fifth
prohibited the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Liberty
in the Fifth Amendment had been construed by the Court to include
speech, but it still could be limited so long as due process was ac
corded. There were thus two classes of liberties in the Constitution,
nonabridgable and abridgable liberties, and speech could be included in
both. It was crucial to determine what sorts of speech belonged in each
class.1s1
For Meiklejohn the answer was obvious. Speech as a due process,
abridgable liberty was correlated to rights such as life and property, pri
vate rights. Speech in the First Amendment referred to public speech,
the freedom of public discussion. Thus " [t]he constitutional status of a
merchant advertising his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the ad
vantage of his client, is utterly different from that of a citizen who is
planning for the general welfare." 152 The question in every case was
whether the speech was public or private, unabridgable or abridgable.153
Meiklejohn's theory of free speech was closely connected not only
to the bifurcated review project but to the search to identify those forms
of speech that were sufficiently connected to the democratic model of
politics to be presumptively immune from majoritarian restrictions. Al
though the point of departure for his theory was the perceived threat to
speech he found in the Court's Cold War subversive advocacy cases, he
had larger goals in mind.
It is instructive that in Meiklejohn's discussion of the clear and
present danger test for speech, which occupied most of his attention in

Free Speech, his primary emphasis was on the inadequacy of the "mar
ketplace" metaphor offered by Holmes in his Abrams dissent. In one
passage Meiklejohn spelled out his objections to that metaphor:

151. See id. at 37-39.
152. Id. at 38-39.
153. Meiklejohn was not a lawyer, and commentators with legal training have reg
ularly attacked his effort to distinguish First Amendment speech rights from Fifth
Amendment speech rights as confused and even incoherent. Chafee reviewed Free
Speech and Its Relationship to Self-Government in 1949 and suggested that
Meiklejohn's attempt to do constitutional exegesis was analogous to his attempt to
break up a fight among students when he was a professor of philosophy at Brown Uni
versity before becoming President of Amherst. The only thing Meiklejohn's intervention
in the fight had accomplished, Chafee suggested, was the denting of Meiklejohn's hat.
See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891, 891-92 (1949); see
also LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 149-51 (1986).
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We Americans . . . have taken the "competition of the market" principle
to mean that as separate thinkers, we have no obligation to test our think
ing, to make sure that it is worthy of a citizen who is one of the "rulers
of the nation." That testing is to be done, we believe, not by us, but by
"the competition of the market." Each one of us, therefore, feels free to
think as he pleases, to believe whatever will serve his own private inter
ests. We think, not as members of the body politic . . . but as farmers, as
trade-union workers, as employers, as investors. . . . And our aim, as we
debate in those capacities, is not that of finding the truth. . . . Our aim is
to "make a case," to win a fight, to make our plea plausible, to keep the
pressure on. And the intellectual degradation which that interpretation of
truth-testing has brought upon the minds of our people is almost unbe
lievable. Under its influence, there are no standards for determining the
difference between the true and the false. The truth is what a man or an
interest or a nation can get away with. That dependence on intellectual
laissez-faire, more than any other single factor, has destroyed the founda
tions of our national education .

. . . 1s4

This argument, of course, flatly denied any connection between the
marketplace of ideas and a search for truth. That "marketplace" was
like other markets, where the truth was "what a man or an interest or a
nation can get away with." This equation of marketplaces with intellec
tual degradation was a general theme of Free

Speech.

Meiklejohn pos

ited distinctions between self-government and mere economic prefer
ence, between civic responsibility and what one could "get away with,"
between a collective search for information about public issues and "in
tellectual laissez-faire. "
It was as if Meiklejohn wanted to identify Holmes's marketplace
metaphor with a whole catalog of bogeys associated with the collapse
of an unregulated capitalist order. At one point Meiklejohn praised
Brandeis's concurrence in

Whitney

as having "brought us far along the

road toward . . . the absolute freedom of public discussion," and having
"den[ied] at its very roots the [clear and present danger] principle
which had been formulated by Mr. Holmes" 155 in the unfortunate mar
ketplace metaphor. He neglected to mention that Holmes had joined
Brandeis's

Whitney

opinion, or that Brandeis continued to insist that the

clear and present danger test should govern subversive advocacy cases.
Only by understanding the intellectual context in which

Speech

Free

appeared can one explain the subsequent influence of the

"Meiklejohn Interpretation" of the First Amendment. 156 For those of

154. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 86-87.
155. Id. at 54-55.
156. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpre
tation of the First Amendment, 19 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965) (acknowledging a connec-
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Meiklejohn's contemporaries who were committed to the bifurcated re
view project, the clear and present danger test, despite its attractiveness
as a device that gave judges maximum power and flexibility in speech
cases, raised many of the problems of substantive judging associated
with Lochner. 1 51 In addition, the preferred position characterization a1so
appeared to be a comparably open invitation for unconstrained judicia1
lawmaking, since those employing that characterization had given very
little guidance as to which kinds of speech rights were to be preferred.
The Meiklejohn interpretation, for a11 its ana1ytic deficiencies, rep
resented an ingenious bifurcated review "solution." One attractive fea
ture has already been noted: by abandoning clear and present danger for
a more "absolutist" approach to protecting speech, but confining the
category of protected speech to public speech, Meiklejohn's approach
ostensibly avoided the opportunities for substantive judging inherent in
clear and present danger. This feature was particularly responsive to the
context of subversive advocacy cases in the aftermath of World War II.
Meiklejohn's approach, for example, would have characterized the

nis

Den

defendants' activity as public speech and protected it, at least to the

point where the leaders of the Communist Party had not yet created an
emergency by advocating immediate revolution. 1 58
A second attractive feature of Meiklejohn's approach was that it
preserved much of the doctrinal framework of First Amendment juris
prudence, including the intuitive attempts of the Court to create a hier
archy of protected expressions. It was well-settled at the time of the ap
pearance of

Free Speech

that the First Amendment did not apply to a

variety of expressions, including commercia1 speech, 159 libel and slan
der, 160 obscenity, 1 6 1 and unauthorized disclosure of private informa-

tion between Meiklejohn's theoretical rationale for the protection of free speech and
certain Warren Court First Amendment decisions).
157. Meiklejohn noted this in Free Speech, suggesting that Chafee's "search for
truth" justification presupposed a judicial "balancing" of "[t]he interest in the public
safety and the interest in the search for truth." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 64. In
Meiklejohn's view balancing was appropriate only when a private need in individuals to
speak was balanced against the public safety. Such a balancing was permissible under
Fifth Amendment methodology, but that was reserved for private speech. The First
Amendment, according to Meiklejohn, was "not saying that any man may talk when
ever and wherever he chooses"; it was "not dealing with that private issue." It was
saying that "as interests, the integrity of public discussion and the care for the public
safety are identical." In public speech cases under the First Amendment, there was no
need for judicial balancing. Public speech was fully protected. See id. at 65.
158. See id. at 54-55.
159. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
160. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
161. See 315 U.S. at 568.
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tion.162 By describing each of these expressions as private speech,
Meiklejohn avoided the intrusion of the First Amendment into a number
of established common law doctrines. Moreover, an intuitive distinction
between public and private expression already existed in free speech
cases, as illustrated by the Court's treatment of commercial speech and
its characterization of the solicitation efforts of Jehovah's Witnesses as
noncommercial. Meiklejohn's tacit relegation of private expressions to a
lower-value category of speech resonated with the views of those who
were concerned with maintaining legislative control over economic or
commercial activities in the

post-Lochner era.

Meiklejohn's approach also promised to clarify the meaning of the
democratic speech singled out for protection in the preferred position
cases. He explicitly associated public speech with the processes of edu
cation and responsible citizenship in a democracy. The metaphoric con
struct that he employed to introduce his theory of free speech was not
the marketplace of ideas but the New England town meeting: a public
forum in which all citizens participated and spoke freely about civic af
fairs. As Meiklejohn described it:
In the town meeting the people of a community assemble to discuss
and to act upon matters of public interest - roads, schools, poorhouses,
health, external defense, and the like. Every man is free to come. They
meet as political equals. Each has a right and duty to think his own
thoughts, to express them, and to listen to the arguments of others. The
basic principle is that the freedom of speech shall be unabridged. . . .
. . . As the self-governing community seeks, by the method of vot
ing, to gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its indi
vidual citizens. If they fail, it fails. That is why freedom of discussion for
those minds may not be abridged.163

In Meiklejohn's characterization, the search for truth formulation was
stripped of its marketplace dimensions. In his portrait of the town meet
ing no private or commercial issues corrupted the discussion: only pub
lic matters such as roads, schools, poorhouses, and public health were
on the agenda. The speech that he sought to protect was that associated
with the quintessentially public and democratic act of voting on non
commercial community issues.
Finally, Meiklejohn's interpretation offered a way out of the appar
ent dilemma between protection for speech rights and a commitment to
the principle of majority rule in a democracy. One could argue that if
the central purpose of speech was to foster individual citizen participa-

162. See Barber v. Time Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
163. MEIKLEJoHN, supra note 146, at 22-25.
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tion in a democracy, an equation of majoritarian policies with the col
lective will of the democratic citizenry was dependent on that un
restricted

participation.

Otherwise

a

majority

was

not

truly

representative and its decisions not truly democratic. Majoritarian deci
sions restricting speech rights were thus open to the charge that they
sought to block the very channels of citizen participation that justified
majority rule.
But for all the apparent ingenuity of Meiklejohn's approach, it ap
peared to contain a significant internal tension. If protection for free
speech was so vital and necessary a task in American society, so indis
pensable a condition of America as a democracy, it would appear that
free speech itself was an important cultural phenomenon, something to
be cherished. Moreover, if the central importance of speech in facilitat
ing the democratic political process meant that the political speech of
individuals could not be restricted without threatening the integrity of
that process, then in an important sense individual speech rights
trumped

majoritarian

efforts

to

restrict

them.

Why,

then,

had

Meiklejohn offered so limited a definition of protected speech? One
might have surmised from his elevation of the significance of individual
speech rights in a democracy, and of free speech itself, that democratic
theory required a wide latitude for individuals to speak freely on all
subjects. Yet Meiklejohn insisted that democratic theory only required a
wide latitude for individuals to speak on public subjects.
Thus in making a powerful argument that individual public speech,
in a democratic society, trumps majoritarian efforts to restrict it,
Meiklejohn implicitly was raising the possibility that the self-education
of individual citizens might not invariably be confined to public expres
sions. Speech that signified the desire of individual citizens to learn
more about themselves and the world around them might have value in
a democracy whether or not it appeared to be directed toward public is
sues. The capacity of humans to effectively govern themselves might be
a product of qualities, such as self-confidence or integrity, that were not
easily labeled public or private. The two components of the self-govern
ance rationale, "self" and "governance," bore a problematic connec
tion to Meiklejohn's insistence on maintaining the distinction between
public and private speech.
C.

Launching the Progression Toward Absolutism: The Reception of
Meiklejohn in the 1950s and 1960s
The initial reviews of

Free Speech

criticized Meiklejohn's reading

of clear and present danger, his constitutional exegesis, and the level of
protection for public speech he advocated. But comparatively few re-

Michigan Law Review

350

[Vol. 95:299

viewers even alluded to the linchpin of Meiklejohn's approach, his dis
tinction between public and private speech.1 64 Meiklejohn's metaphors
and examples made it clear that he had a strong intuitive sense about
which sorts of expressions were public and which private, and that he
did not anticipate a particularly large category of expressions that were
to be treated as unabridgable. Most early reviewers found that intuition
unremarkable.
By the 1 950s free speech cases had come to the Supreme Court in
increased numbers, and several conceptual problems had surfaced. Al
though the problems took different forms in different doctrinal areas of
ranging from subversive advocacy1 65

First Amendment coverage,

through a variety of areas now assembled under the category "low
value" speech,1 66 they can be treated as specific variants on a general
puzzle raised by the Meiklejohn interpretation.
That general puzzle can be stated as follows: If, on the one hand,
speech freedom was at the very core of cultural self-definition in
America, and if, on the other, one granted Meiklejohn's premise that
such freedom was only implicated in public speech, should First
Amendment balancing remain part of the methodology of free speech
jurisprudence? Or, alternatively, should an enhanced version of the cat
egorist methodology suggested by Brandeis in

Whitney,

premised on a

stark separation between "public" and "private" speech, replace the
social interest balancing proposed by Chafee and operationalized in the

164. A sampling of legal periodicals for the 1948-1949 academic year yielded nine
reviews. See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Book Review, 36 CAL. L. R.Ev. 667 (1948);
Chafee, supra note 153; Osmond K. Fraenkel, Book Review, 14 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PR.OBS. 167 (1949); John P. Frank, Book Review, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 405 (1949); Ir
ving M. Gruber, Book Review, 8 LAW. GUILD R.Ev. 508 (1948); Arthur Garfield Hays,
Book Review, 97 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 751 (1949); Charles B. Nutting, Book Review, 10 U.
Prrr. L. R.Ev. 254 (1948); Eve Thomas, Book Review, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 66 (1948); Book
Note, 47 MICH. L. R.Ev. 734 (1949). Of those only Chafee, Thomas, and Frank men
tioned Meiklejohn's distinction between public and private speech. See Chafee, supra
note 153, at 899-900; Frank, supra, at 41 1; Thomas, supra, at 67. Chafee's criticism
was the most extensive and telling. He called Meiklejohn's "supposed boundary be
tween public speech and private speech" the "most serious weakness in [his] argu
ment." Chafee, supra note 153, at 899. He wondered in what category would be in
cluded books or plays, scholarship, and the arts. "The truth is," Chafee suggested, "that
there are public aspects to practically every subject." Id. at 900.
165. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
166. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (concerning commer
cial speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (concerning fighting
words); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (precipitating a breach of the
peace).
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clear and present danger test? And, if so, could such a methodology es
tablish any legitimacy?
As the Warren Court began reconsidering speech cases in the
1950s and

1960s, a categorist methodology, loosely termed First

Amendment "absolutism, " 1 67 surfaced as a respectable doctrinal per
spective. The progression toward absolutism in free speech jurispru
dence took two distinct stages. In the first stage, the Warren Court
emerged as the most significant institutional champion of free speech to
appear thus far in America. In subversive advocacy cases, the Court ob
literated Dennis by fashioning a distinction between advocacy of unlaw
ful action and advocacy of belief. 168 Only the former satisfied the clear
and present danger test, so a mere showing that a defendant belonged to
a political organization (the Communist Party) whose doctrines advo
cated the overthrow of the Government was insufficient to make out a
conviction under the Smith Act. Eventually the Court made the clear
and present danger test significantly more speech-protective by permit
ting convictions for subversive advocacy only "where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action." 169
Meanwhile, as two Justices, Black and Douglas, declared them
selves to be " absolutists," and several others, notably Brennan, Warren,

167. "Absolutism" in First Amendment jurisprudence has, of course, never been
the equivalent of unlimited protection for all speech, even all public speech. None of
the free speech theorists surveyed in this article assumed that the First Amendment's
categorical language prevents Congress from making any law that abridges speech in
any conceivable fashion. The familiar example is a law making it a crime to advocate
the immediate assassination of a public official. Absolutism in First Amendment juris
prudence refers to a jurisprudential perspective that ostensibly rejects balancing in free
speech cases for an analysis that treats some, or even all, forms of expression as pre
sumptively protected, capable of being abridged only by the showing of a very strong
interest on the part of the government in maintaining its own survival or that of its bed
rock principles.
168. See Yates, 354 U.S. at 324-27. In Scales, a 5-4 majority of the Court was sat
isfied that "the teaching of forceful overthrow, accompanied by directions as to the type
of illegal action which must be taken when the time for revolution is reached," was suf
ficient for a Smith Act conviction, but that the teaching alone was not. Scales, 367 U.S.
at 234.
169. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg
the most inflammatory comment made by the speaker, and eventually broadcast on tele
vision, went as follows:
The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organiza
tion. We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that
there might have to be some revengeance taken.
We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand
strong.
395 U.S. at 446 (quotation marks omitted).
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and Marshall, adopted highly speech-protective positions, the Court be
gan whittling away at the types of speech that Meiklejohn would, at
least in 1948, have swept into his private, unprotected category.170 Nota
ble among them were defamation171 and false light privacy,172 which
came to be treated as presumptively unabridgable in some contexts. In
some Warren Court decisions Meiklejohn was cited approvingly, 173 and
his distinction between public and private speech was treated as a
meaningful doctrinal rubric.174 Meiklejohn endorsed some of the devel
opments: he was reported as saying, of the

New York Times

decision,

"It is an occasion for dancing in the streets. "175
But then the progression toward First Amendment absolutism en
tered a second stage, one in which the all-important distinction, for
Meiklejohn, between public and private expressions began to break
down. Eventually the Court would confer protection on a broad cate
gory of speech - commercial speech - that Meiklejohn had assumed
to be entirely outside the range of the First Amendment's coverage. In
order to understand how this development came to occur, it is necessary
to shift attention from Meiklejohn to the next influential twentieth
century First Amendment theoretician, Thomas I. Emerson.
V.

EMERSON AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF MODERNIST FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Emerson's treatise,

The System of Freedom of Expression,

appeared

in its fullest version in 1 970.176 Emerson's work, although grounded in

170. In Free Speech Meiklejohn had listed "libellous assertions" and "slander" as
"fonns of speech" that "may be, and must be, forbidden and punished." MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 146, at 18.
171. See New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
172. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
173. See Brennan, supra note 156 (underscoring the role of Meiklejohn's approach
in the majority opinion in New York Times); Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Tunes
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV.
191, 208-09 (noting the majority opinion's debt to Meiklejohn and suggesting that the
core of First Amendment protection was for "speech without which de�ocracy cannot
function").
174. Notably in the area of defamation, where a progression of cases, stretching
from New York Times to Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985), the Supreme Court eventually tied a First Amendment privilege to the
"public figure" status of the defendant or to the "public" or "private" nature of the
communication.
175. See Kalven, supra note 173, at 221 n.125.
176. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970)
[hereinafter EMERSON, SYSTEM]. That work represented an expansion and further re
finement of Emerson's 1966 book, THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THE
ORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
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the contributions of both Chafee and Meiklejohn and sharing many of
their theoretical premises, had the perhaps unintended effect of pointing
free speech theory in quite different directions from what they had an
ticipated. Emerson's interpretive theory of the First Amendment repre
sents a culmination of the logic of modernist premises as applied to free
speech issues. At the same time it can be seen as exposing the poten
tially contradictory nature of those premises and as severing the as
sumed connection between protection for free speech and democratic
theory that previously had animated twentieth-century First Amendment
jurisprudence.
As speech-protective jurisprudence gained additional momentum in
the 1950s and 1960s, its original modernist premises appeared to have
been modified. Rationalism and empiricism were compatible with
Meiklejohn's emphasis on protecting public speech,m but those prem
ises had been subsumed in the "town meeting" metaphor, which prima
rily emphasized the connections between cognitive freedom and demo
cratic theory. Speech-protective interpretations of the First Amendment
increasingly emphasized two rationales: protection for speech furthered
cognitive freedom and protection for speech underscored the democratic
orientation of American society.

Another significant figure in the development of free speech jurisprudence in the
1960s and 1970s was Harry Kalven. See, e.g., Harry Kalven Jr., The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REv. 1; Harry Kalven Jr., Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn
and the Barenblatt Opinion, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 315 (1960); Kalven, supra note 173;
Harry Kalven Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SUP. Cr. REv. 267. For Kalven's most synthetic treatment of free speech
issues, which appeared after his death, see HARRY KAI.VEN JR., A WORTHY TRADI
TION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988), edited with an introduction by his
son Jamie Kalven.
Emerson's work has been singled out for treatment in this article because it repre
sents a more extended synthesis of free speech issues than anything Kalven produced in
the 1960s, and because Kalven's own synthesis, A Worthy Tradition, was incomplete at
his death. The selection of Emerson is for heuristic purposes and should not be taken as
a comparative comment on his and Kalven's stature.
177. Consider the following passage from Free Speech:
[I]n that method of political self-government [the town meeting], the point of ul
timate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The
final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise decisions . . . . The welfare of the
community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They
must know what they are voting about And this, in turn, requires that so far as
time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and
fairly presented at the meeting
The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.
. . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 25.
.

.

.

•
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The relationship between those rationales, which the preferred
position advocates and Meiklejohn had taken as necessarily self-rein
forcing, became perceived as ambiguous. Democratic theory could be
seen as channeling protected speech into a public category of expres
sion, as Meiklejohn urged, or democratic theory could be seen as giving
impetus to

self-expression itself,

as a symbol of the high value democ

racy placed on the diverse contributions of individual citizens. Liberta
rian free speech theory thus could potentially expand the concept of
freedom in First Amendment jurisprudence by disengaging freedom
from Meiklejohn's conception of self-governance. Emerson was to
struggle with the implications of that potential development.
A.
1.

Emerson's Dilemmas

The "Self-Fulfillment" Rationale For Protecting Speech

The Meiklejohn interpretation became enlisted in the Warren
Court's move toward First Amendment absolutism, but the very process
of enlistment began to place pressure on Meiklejohn's self-governance
formulation. Instead of fashioning numerous refinements of the bound
ary between public and private speech, activist judges, comfortable with
the ideological correctness of progressively expanding First Amendment
freedoms in modem America,

devoted their energy to widening

Meiklejohn's category of protected expressions. Some of the new candi
dates for protection represented the very sorts of expressions that
Meiklejohn might well have relegated to the private sphere. 178 These de
velopments not only unsettled the Meiklejohnian boundary between
unabridgable and abridgable speech, they appeared to make less com
pelling Meiklejohn's insistence that protection for speech be coupled
with self-governance in a democracy. Out of this swirl of activity came
a new theoretical rationale for protecting speech, self-fulfillment, with
which Emerson was prominently identified.
Emerson was no less enlisted in the premises of modernist juris
prudence than Chafee or Meiklejohn. In the first chapter of

The System

178. In Free Speech Meiklejohn, after insisting that "the First Amendment stands
guard over the freedom of public speech but is indifferent to the rights of private
speech," suggested that:
It would be a fascinating and important task to follow those implications as they
bear upon the rights to freedom which are claimed, for example, by lobbyists for
special interests, by advertisers in press or radio, by picketing labor unions . . .
by the distributors of handbills on city streets . . . and many others. In all these
cases the crucial task is that of separating public and private claims.
Id. at 99. First Amendment claims in each of these areas were considered by the Su
preme Court in the 1960s and 1 970s.
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Emerson gave an overview of the "main

premises" of a "system of freedom of expression in a democratic soci
ety" that amounted to a textbook summary of modernist epistemol
ogy. 179 First was the affirmation of human cognitive capabilities. "The
proper end of man," Emerson declared, "is the realization of his char
acter and potentialities as a human being." To cut off expression was
"to elevate society and the state to a despotic command over him and
to place him under the arbitrary control of others." 180
The freedom premise was followed by the empiricist constraint,
embodied in search for truth language. Emerson stressed the centrality
of expression as "an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth." 181 The methodology of "open discussion" was lik
ened to the methodology of scientific experimentation: " [a]n individual
who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question, con
sider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and

make full use of different minds." 182 The presentation of "unaccepted

opinion[s] . . . compel[s] a rethinking and retesting of the accepted
opinion." Through open discussion "many of the most widely acknowl

edged truths" had been shown "to be erroneous." 183

Next came an assertion of the indispensable connection between
free speech and the idea of democracy. Freedom of expression was "es
sential to provide for participation in decision making by all members
of society." 184 Once one accepted the democratic philosophy "of the
Declaration of Independence - that governments 'derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed' " - it followed that all the
people "must, in order to exercise their right of consent, have full free
dom of expression . . . in forming the common judgment." 185
Last was the rationalist constraint. Suppression of open discussion

made "a rational judgment impossible, substituting force for reason." 186
The process of open discussion, in contrast, "promotes greater cohesion
in a society because people are more ready to accept decisions that go

against them if they have a part in the decision-making process." Since
the process produced truth, it provided a foundation for rational deci-

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Michigan Law Review

356

[Vol. 95:299

sionmaking, thus facilitating social progress without "destroying . . .
the balance between stability and change." 1 87
The order in which Emerson listed his premises represented a sub
tle difference in emphasis from the formulations of Chafee and
Meiklejohn. Chafee explicitly identified the social interest in the search
for truth as a more important rationale than the individual interest in ex
pression. His hierarchy of premises had been made more explicit by
Meiklejohn, who reserved an absolute level of protection for that
speech that was directly connected to "the voting of wise decisions"
and suggested that such speech should not be seen as individual and
private but as collective and public. 1 88
Emerson incorporated those rationales, but did not rank them first
in his listing of the premises underlying protection for free speech. That
place was reserved for the premise that "freedom of expression is es
sential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. " 1 89 For Emer
son this individual interest in self-fulfillment outweighed in importance
all social interests that might be advanced on behalf of protection for
speech. Free speech was at bottom an affirmation of human "freedom"
- an affirmation of the potential of humans as causal agents. 1 90
Emerson's singling out of freedom qua self-fulfillment as the pre
dominant rationale for protecting speech represented an important wa
tershed in the twentieth-century intellectual history of free speech juris
prudence. This rearrangement opened the way not only for a continued
uncoupling of the modernist freedom premise from the constraints of
empiricism and rationalism, but also a potential uncoupling of freedom
from the idea of democracy.
In particular, Emerson's emphasis on self-fulfillment as the most
significant value fostered by protection for expression intimated that
protection for free speech rights might clash with outcomes reached
through the process of democratic politics, or with an interest in the
spread of truth, or with the maintenance of rationality, order, and stabil
ity in public discourse. The logic of Emerson's emphasis suggested that
an individual speaker's freedom primarily inhered not in his member
ship as a citizen in a democratic community, or as a searcher after truth,

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 25-27.
EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 6.
See id. Emerson's conviction of the importance of self-fulfillment

as a ratio
nale for protecting free speech may have been enhanced by his involvement in efforts to
protect the choice of married couples to receive information about birth control, which
eventually led to the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). Progeny decisions on the part of individuals within a marriage
amounted to an example of human cognitive freedom.
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or as a contributor to rational decisionmaking, but as an autonomous

human being. 19 1

Emerson's rearrangement of the premises underlying protection for
free speech thus helps distinguish his contribution from those of his in
fluential twentieth-century predecessors. That feature of Emerson's free
speech jurisprudence, however, was not the only defining one. Equally
important was Emerson's failure to grasp fully the implications of his
rearrangement. Emerson, like Chafee and Meiklejohn, developed an ap
proach to free speech that led to troublesome conceptual puzzles. But,
as some examples will illustrate, Emerson barely addressed, let alone
attempted to solve, those puzzles.
2.

"Hard" Free Speech Cases

In the first chapter of The

System of Freedom of Expression

Emer

son confronted the question of how one could justify an active role for
the judiciary as a protector of free speech rights when judicial activism
on behalf of economic "liberties" had become discredited. His response
was characteristic of those who sought to promote bifurcated review:
In considering the role of the judiciary in a system of freedom of expres
sion it is essential to . . . establish a fundamental distinction. We are not
dealing here with any general function of our judicial institutions to fos
ter the whole range of freedoms in a democratic society. Nor are we
dealing with any broad power to supervise or review all major actions of
the legislative and executive branches. We are concerned with the spe
cific function of the judiciary in supporting a system of freedom of
expression. 1 92

Emerson's conception of the judiciary "as a mediator between the gov
ernment and the people," exercising the power of judicial review, was
limited to free speech cases. 193 He did not seek to revive aggressive ju
dicial review as a general proposition.
Emerson's emphasis on the self-fulfillment rationale, however,
suggested that the idea of protection for free speech might be severable
from the idea of promoting democratic theory. It suggested that some
expressions, unrelated on their face to the democratic model of politics
191. Another way to describe Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale was that it im
plicitly began to incorporate emotive as well as cognitive expressions within a constitu
tionally protected category. The inclusion of emotive speech within the First Amend
ment's umbrella of protection arguably applied modernist aesthetics to free speech
jurisprudence - freedom of taste in addition to freedom of thought - and stripped
protected speech of the constraints of empiricism and rationalism. Emerson did not fully
anticipate these developments. See infra text accompanying notes 225-42.
192. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 13.
193. See id. at 12.
·

Michigan Law Review

358

[Vol. 95:299

or even, arguably, to the expanded idea of democracy itself, nonetheless
might come under the umbrella of the First Amendment.
In addition to the problem of justifying bifurcated review itself,
Emerson encountered at least four types of free speech cases in which
his successive rationales for protecting speech seemed to contradict,
rather than support, each other, with the self-fulfillment rationale threat
ening to swallow up the others. The first of those was commercial
speech. "The rule that communications in the 'commercial sector' of
our society are outside the system of freedom of expression," Emerson
noted, "has never been fully explained."194 He suggested that neither
the courts nor commentators had made clear just what constituted the
"commercial sector." Although that term seemed to signify a class of
cases involving "the production and exchange of goods and services for
profit," as distinguished from those involving "the production or ex
change of ideas on political, religious, artistic, and similar matters,"
Emerson thought the distinction "very crude." 195 He also found that it
had not been consistently followed in the Court's free speech cases:
some decisions sharply distinguished between a "public right" of ex
pression and "purely commercial advertising, " 196 and others declared
that the First Amendment rights of booksellers were unaffected by the
fact "that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices." 197
Nonetheless the "commercial sector" doctrine was still "well es
tablished" at the time of the publication of

Expression, 198

The System of Freedom of

and Emerson sought to advance some justifications for it.

He could only come up with two and presented them perfunctorily. One
was that "it speaks well for a society that it accords greater freedom to
the exchange of ideas than it gives to the exchange of material
things."199 The other was that "society feels it necessary to give greater
protection to its citizens in material affairs than in the affairs of the
mind. " 200 Both justifications were related to the intuitive distinctions
between ideas and material entities that were made by proponents of the
bifurcated review project.

1 94. Id. at 414.
195. Id. at 414-15.
196. Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Valentine v. Chresten
sen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
1 97. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 1 47, 150 (1959)).
198. See id. at 415 & n.1 .
199. Id. at 415.
200. Id. Emerson called this " [a] less worthy rationale." Id. It is not clear how the
absence of protection for commercial speech would give "greater protection to . . . citi
zens in material affairs than in the-affairs of the mind.'' Id.
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But despite those intuitions, Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale
threatened the lower level of protection accorded speech in the commer
cial sector. Who was to say that a creative slogan for a product was any
more or less a realization of human potential than a novel about the ad
vertising industry? Who was to say that expressive activities designed
to generate money for their speakers were any less noble than other ex
pressive activities? Meiklejohn's distinction between public and private
speech had initially located all commercial expressions as outside the
ambit of First Amendment protection, but Meiklejohn eventually con
cluded, in a 1961 article, that literary and artistic expressions were ver
sions of public speech.201 That conclusion blurred his initial distinction
considerably, most noticeably in the cases of literary and artistic contri
butions disseminated for profit. With the public status of certain com
mercial expressions now recognized, Emerson's self-fulfillment ratio
nale only weakened the commercial sector doctrine further.
The second area was libel law. Emerson noted that, beginning with
the

New York Times

case, the Supreme Court appeared to be organizing

the constitutional law of libel around Meiklejohn's distinction between
public and private speech. He then attacked the distinction, asserting
that "there has never been a satisfactory definition of what is meant by
'public speech.' "202 He pointed out that if the public speech realm was
defined narrowly - as Meiklejohn originally had intended - it ex
cluded "communication relating to art, literature, music, science and
recreation."203 If used expansively, however, the term "would seem to
have no limits," for "[i]t is hard to conceive of anything . . . that can
not be said to have some relation to social issues."204
Emerson clearly was troubled about the relationship of libel law to
his general approach to First Amendment issues. It appeared that all of
the rationales he advanced for protecting speech were served by al
lowing full protection for false statements on public issues, even if they
injured someone's reputation. Such statements were part of the process
by which citizens informed themselves about public issues, learned the
truth, and helped themselves make rational decisions. They also fur
thered the value of self-fulfillment, because they were devices through
which citizens expressed themselves on public matters.205

201. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment ls an Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REv. 245, 257, 262-63.

202.
203.
204.
205.

EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 541.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 531-43.
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Emerson balked, however, at expanding protection for libels whose
only purpose seemed to be to "injur[e] . . . individual feelings."206 Al
though he had previously rejected Meiklejohn's public-private speech
distinction as unworkable, he advanced another distinction, that between
"expression" and "action."207 Communication having the sole effect of
hurting another individual's feelings, he felt, was "the equivalent of
'action,' similar to a physical assault. The harm done tends to be direct
and instantaneous, and not remediable by longer-range social processes
that can prevent subsequent damage. "208 Such communication was like
speech that called for "imminent and dangerous" action: its major im
pact was not as "expression" at all.209
Emerson's strained distinction between expression and action in li
bel cases helps reveal the tension between his successive rationales for
protecting speech. Three of his four rationales had a distinctively public
dimension. The search for truth and the promotion of rationality as an
alternative to force were associated with the goal of enlightened public
decisionmaking in a democracy, and the rationale of promoting com
ment on matters of public concern was explicitly linked to the voting
process. But the self-fulfillment rationale, especially as the concept of
speech expanded to include the creative arts, could not be so easily as
sociated with the public sphere of life. Emerson recognized that
Meiklejohn's distinction between public and private speech had proved
increasingly untenable. Yet he continued to retain an intuitive sense that
merely private communications, bearing no apparent connection to
democratic self-government, should not receive the same high level of
First Amendment protection, even though they obviously furthered self
fulfillment.
Two other forms of expression presented Emerson with compara
ble problems: campaign contributions or expenditures and lobbying.
Those areas differed from ordinary commercial speech or defamation,
however, in that the traditional purpose of legislative efforts to control
corrupt practices or lobbying was that of purification of the electoral
process so as to make it more democratic. Here Emerson confronted an
obvious clash between self-fulfillment and his other rationales, because
corrupt practices and lobbying legislation sought to further self
government by restricting speech.

206.
207.
208.
209.

See id. at 543.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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In a series of cases going back to the nineteenth century, including
the 1934 decision in

Burroughs

v.

United States,210

the Court had sus

tained federal and state legislation regulating corrupt practices in elec
tion campaigns. Such legislation required disclosure of the sources of
campaign funds, set limits on campaign contributions and expenditures,
prohibited certain groups from contributing to campaigns, prohibited
federal employees from making campaign contributions, and in one in
stance prohibited comment on election issues on the day the election
was scheduled.21 1 As late as the mid-1960s the constitutionality of most
of this legislation still seemed taken for granted.
Emerson wondered why comparatively little attention had been
given to the free speech implications of corrupt practices legislation. "If
a candidate in an election can be required to disclose his income and
expenditures for expression," he asked, " why cannot all other persons
be required to make similar disclosures in connection with other expres
sion?"21 2 He also suggested that if the government could "equalize the
amount of speech uttered in a campaign" by controlling the volume of
campaign expenditures, why could it not "equalize the amount of
speech uttered on any subject?"213 The Court's corrupt practices deci
sions, he concluded, had "advanced no theory upon which to base an
answer to these questions. "2 14
There was in fact an intuition driving the decisions, although it had
perhaps not reached the level of a theory. Corrupt practices legislation,
even though it restricted speech, could be seen as fostering all of the ra
tionales for protecting speech in a democracy except self-fulfillment. By
preventing any one individual or group from dominating public debate
about electoral issues, the legislation ostensibly promoted the search for
truth, encouraged the formulation of rational policies, and fostered self
government. That it did so at the expense of free expression was obvi
ous, but the kind of expression being limited could be seen as under
mining the democratic process.

If Emerson recognized the above defense of corrupt practices leg
islation, he did not weigh it very heavily. He proposed limiting such
legislation to regulations on individual candidates in election cam-

210. 290 U.S. 534 (1934). A nineteenth-century decision exhibiting a similar view
was Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
21 1 . See Rabban, Forgotten Years, supra note 4, at 531, 541, 551-53 for additional
cases. The last example was raised by an Alabama statute that the Court invalidated, as
applied to a newspaper editorial that appeared on the day of a municipal election, in
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
212. EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 639.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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paigns. He did not think that most groups should be restricted in their
contributions, or that noncandidates should be prevented from distribut
ing anonymous campaign literature. To the extent he thought corrupt
practices legislation useful, it was as a check against "the potential mo
nopoly control over expression conferred upon the candidate. "215 He
felt that "corporations could be controlled on the theory they were part
of the commercial sector and thus outside the regular system of free
dom of expression. "21 6 The contributions and expenditures of labor un
ions, on the other hand, could not be controlled.217
Emerson was equally doubtful about the constitutionality of legis
lation regulating lobbying. He pointed to

United States v. Harriss,218

in

which the Court sustained the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act,
which required detailed reports to Congress from any persons who had
received contributions or who had expended money to influence Con
gressional legislation. The Court had narrowed the reach of the statute
to persons who had engaged in "direct communication" with members
of Congress. That did not impress Emerson, who concluded that "lob
bying legislation is difficult to reconcile with the principles of the First
Amendment. "219 The primary purpose of lobbying legislation, he be
lieved, was "to curtail bribery or expose the political motivations of the
legislator to the electorate, interests that cannot constitutionally be ad

vanced by curtailing expression. " 220

Here again Emerson confronted an issue in which restrictions on
speech allegedly were designed to promote freedom of expression in a
democracy by improving the search for truth of legislators and equaliz
ing the weight of the views of all members of the electorate. But of
course restrictions on lobbying, like restrictions on commercial speech
or on campaign contributions, affected the self-fulfillment of particular
members of the public in a direct way. The reason such restrictions had
been tolerated - in some instances not even seen as raising First
Amendment issues - was that as twentieth-century free speech juris
prudence had developed in the shadow of the bifurcated review project,
the self-fulfillment of lobbyists, political interest groups, or corporations
had implicitly been ranked lower than that of, say, dissident political
speakers.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 640.
See id. at 639-40.
347 U.S. 612 (1954).
EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 641-42.
Id. at 642.
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The Surfacing of Internal Contradictions in Free Speech
Jurisprudence

With the appearance of Emerson's

pression,
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The System of Freedom of Ex

free speech jurisprudence began to exhibit some significant in

ternal strains. Emerson did not act as if his emphasis on self-fulfillment
had undermined the traditional twentieth-century rationales for protect
ing speech. He listed them alongside self-fulfillment. But as the logic of
protection for self-expression gained momentum in the 1950s and 1 960s
and widened the category of constitutionally protected expressions,
thereby placing pressure on Meiklejohn's distinction between public and
private speech, the self-reinforcing nature of the modernist premises of
cognitive freedom, empiricism, and rationality threatened to dissolve.

An implicit assumption of the search for truth rationale, and, for
that matter, of the Supreme Court's decision in the early 1940s to iden
tify a category of "lower value" expressions that were not candidates
for First Amendment protection, was that eventually Americans could
agree as to what constituted true information, or rational policies, or, for
that matter, coarse or immoral behavior. Excluding lewd or profane

speech as playing "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, "221 or

"epithets or personal abuse" as "not in any proper sense communica
tion of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, "222 was
consistent with this assumption.
Meiklejohn appeared initially to acquiesce in a similar assumption,
at least in the sense of not suggesting that his analysis required a recon
sideration of lower value categories of speech. But as he, and the Court,
began to give a wider scope to the category of public expressions in the
1960s, sweeping into that category literature, the arts, and even libelous
speech directed at public officials or matters of public concern, it ap
peared that eventually some of the archetypal candidates for lower
value categorization might be capable of being conceptualized as public
speech.
Two such candidates surfaced in the 1 970s. In both instances the
Supreme Court concluded that the expressions deserved First Amend
ment protection.223 But when the justifications for protecting the expres
sions are examined, there is little evidence that they were being pro
tected primarily because of their public character, that is, because of

221. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
222. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
223. Only one case produced an actual Supreme Court opinion; in the other the
Court denied certiorari, letting stand a federal circuit court opinion conferring protection
on the expression.

364

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:299

their contributions to the processes of self-governance. In both cases the
courts that concluded that the expressions should be protected primarily
emphasized their value as representations of the diverse viewpoints an
ticipated by a society dedicated to the freedom of individual expression.
The fact that the expressions were coarse, or highly provocative, or ar
guably even false or irrational, as much emotive as cognitive, not only
did not diminish their eligibility for First Amendment protection, it ar
guably cemented that eligibility; the message in both cases was that free
speech above all meant, as Holmes had once said, "freedom for the
thought that we hate. "224
The first case was

Cohen v. California,225

in which the Supreme

Court overturned the conviction of a young man for disturbing the
peace by "offensive conduct." His offense was wearing a jacket in a
municipal courthouse bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." Justice
Harlan, for the Court, found that the message on the jacket was
"speech" rather than "conduct"; that it did not represent "fighting
words" ; and that it was not "obscene." It was merely "offensive"
speech, which was protected by the First Amendment despite its alleg
edly "annoying" and "distasteful" character. " [O]ne man's vulgarity,''
Harlan declared, "is another's lyric." 226
The second was

Collin v. Smith,221

in which the National Socialist

Party of America (NSPA) requested and was denied a permit to march,
wearing Nazi-style uniforms, through the village of Skokie, Illinois, a
Chicago suburb whose population included about 40,000 Jews, several
thousand of whom were survivors of Nazi World War Il concentration
camps.228 The denial was based on several village ordinances, the most
salient one prohibiting the incitement of hatred based on race, national
origin, or religion. Since that ordinance had not been narrowed to cover
only face-to-face confrontations - "fighting words" - it was held un
constitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Neither Cohen nor the NSPA would have received First Amend
ment protection under doctrinal formulations in existence from the
World War I Espionage Act cases through at least the mid-1960s. Wear
ing a jacket with a vulgar message was, alternatively, treated as fighting
words or as conduct rather than speech when that distinction surfaced in

224. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
225. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
226. 403 U.S. at 25.
227. 578 F.2d 1 1 97 (7th Cir. 1978).
228. See BOLLINGER, supra note 153, at 13, 24.
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picketing cases after World War II.229 The message "Fuck the Draft"
was lewd or profane, and thus "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas" under

Chaplinsky.230

NSPA's "message" in the Skokie case em

ployed the use of epithets directed at personal abuse, which

Cantwell

had singled out as unprotected speech. The slogans exhibited by the
marchers might have been treated as a form of group libeling of Jews,
or even potentially as subversive advocacy.231
The opinions in both

Cohen

and the Skokie case, however, ap

peared to have started with an altered consciousness about the existence
of empiricist and rationalist constraints on speech. Rather than assum
ing, as earlier courts had, that the messages in

Cohen

and

Collin

were

so patently juvenile or unsound that they played "no essential part in
any exposition of ideas," courts in the 1970s assumed that such
messages might be sought to be suppressed because they were "inher
ently likely to provoke violent reaction." 232 In

Cohen Justice Harlan de

scribed what he took to be the "constitutional backdrop" against which
free speech cases should be made:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a soci
ety as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to re
move governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, put
ting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately pro
duce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.233

Although there are echoes of Meiklejohn in this excerpt, those ech
oes appear in a passage whose unmistakable purpose is to center the fo
cus of free speech cases on "individual dignity and choice." Although
freedom of expression is identified with "a more capable citizenry" and
a "more perfect polity," the American political system ultimately rests

229. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 235-38 (1963).
230. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
231. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding the constitution
ality of group libel statutes). The assertions of Jewish inferiority that lay at the core of
Nazi ideology could have been treated as "false statements of facts" about Jews. Simi
larly, the Court's subversive advocacy decisions, from Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) through Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), suggested that if
the distribution of antiwar pamphlets during wartime or the exchange of ideas by lead
ers of the American Communist Party during peacetime could be suppressed, a march
by neo-Nazis through an American suburb might be as well. See the discussion of the
Skokie case in BOLLINGER, supra note 153, at 31-33.
232. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
233. 403 U.S. at 24.
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on the free choices of the autonomous individual. The model of demo
cratic politics did not "effectively empower a majority to silence dissi
dents simply as a matter of personal predilections. "234
With

Cohen,

the Skokie case, and other developments in First
·

Amendment jurisprudence that arguably represented even greater depar
tures from Meiklejohn's original formulation of self-governance,235
Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale had been expanded to create a per
spective on First Amendment issues that could be seen as affirming
emotive as well as cognitive freedom as the superordinate First Amend
ment value ("one man's vulgarity is another's lyric"), and arguably dis
associating

that

freedom

from

empirical

inquiry

and

rational

policymaking.
The relationship between self-governance and self-fulfillment in a
society committed to democracy is complicated, and one could argue
that the two rationales can be made complementary in a First Amend
ment jurisprudence that gives the widest possible latitude for individual
citizens to engage in public discourse on subjects that arguably have a

bearing on the process by which citizens participate in public affairs.23 6
But at some point such a jurisprudence requires some criteria for deter
mining what are appropriately public subjects, unless freedom of indi
vidual expression is invariably going to trump majoritarian efforts to re
strict

it.

Meiklejohn,

in

formulating

the

concept

of

"public,"

unabridgable speech, was quite confident that such criteria could be
found, and his criteria were closely connected to the implicit constraints
of relevance and rationality that he found in town meeting discourse.237
Put another way, Meiklejohn was quite confident that the modernist
premises undergirding special status for free speech in American society
were self-reinforcing.
But

Cohen,

the Skokie case, and the Court's decisions narrowing

the definition of proscribable obscene expression either sanctioned a
much broader, perhaps even boundless, conception of public discourse
or suggested that in certain instances speech that bore no true or ra
tional relationship to collective policymaking in a democracy nonethe-

234. 403 U.S. at 21.
235. Consider the Warren Court's decisions in obscenity law, in which two Jus
tices, Douglas and Black, declared that obscenity was "absolutely" protected by the
First Amendment, and several others showed a tendency to invalidate most obscenity
prosecutions. That line of cases culminated in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
in which the Court held that an individual could not be prosecuted under the First
Amendment for watching even concededly "obscene" material in his home.
236. See ROBERT c. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COM
MUNITY, MANAGEMENT 270-72 (1995).
237. Post develops this point effectively. See id. at 274-76.
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Stanley v. Georgia,

367
the Court invalidated a

conviction for possession of allegedly obscene films viewed solely in
one's home, and declared that " [i]f the First Amendment means any
thing, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone
in his own house, what books he may read or films he may watch. "238

It is hard to see how the private viewing of an obscene film bears any
meaningful connection to public discourse. It is easy to see, by contrast,
how freedom to determine the sexual content of materials that one reads
or views in one's home can be derived from the rationale of self
fulfillment.
Emerson might have anticipated that his emphasis on self-fulfill
ment as a paramount First Amendment value could lead to decisions
such as

Cohen

and the Skokie case; he had already noted, and ap

plauded, the Court's libertarian posture toward subversive speech in

Brandenburg

v.

Ohio,239

and he had been a proponent of First Amend

ment protection for most forms of obscene expression.240 But he hardly
could have anticipated that the momentum on behalf of freedom in First
Amendment cases, and the severing of the freedom premise from the
empiricist and rationalist premises in First Amendment theory, would
have threatened the bifurcated standard of constitutional review that he
and his predecessors had sought to develop.
Yet that was precisely what occurred as libertarian free speech the
ory discovered new beneficiaries in the 1 970s and 1 980s. As the self
fulfillment rationale gained momentum, it threatened to sever freedom
of speech from democratic theory and from the empiricist and rational
ist premises that had undergirded the marketplace of ideas and self
govemance rationales. The implicit limits established on categories of
protected speech by those rationales

came

under

strain

as

self

fulfillment took on a more openly pluralistic character. As more speak
ers, and more types of speech, seemed candidates for First Amendment
protection, an original basis for launching the bifurcated review project
- that speech was a particularly special cultural activity in a demo
cratic society - appeared more problematic. For if everyone's speech,
in any form, is free from restriction by the state, it is hard to discern
why the state, as personified by its democratic majorities, has an invest
ment in speech in the first place.

238. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
239. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 156-57,
159-60.
240. See EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176 at 495-503.
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THE RETRENCHMENT OF FREE SPEECH THEORY: SUNSTEIN'S
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
We have seen that prior to the severance of freedom from demo

cratic theory in First Amendment jurisprudence, the main source of
doctrinal tension in free speech jurisprudence lay in the delineation of
the boundaries of public (unabridgable) and private (abridgable) speech,
a process that was central to Meiklejohn's approach. But with the eleva
tion of the self-fulfillment rationale, and the potential severance of free
dom from democratic theory in First Amendment jurisprudence, a dif
ferent locus of tension surfaced. As the value of self-fulfillment became
implicated in an increasing variety of expressive contexts, doctrinal
puzzles began to emerge from cases that were seen as illustrating the
potential opposition of the self-fulfillment rationale and democratic the
ory itself.
A.

" Unexpected Beneficiary" Cases

Beginning in the 1 970s and continuing to the present, the logic of
the self-fulfillment rationale for protecting speech, with its emphasis on
the cognitive and emotive capabilities of the individual, produced a se
ries of First Amendment decisions in which new sorts of claimants
found their expressions swept within the category of protected speech.
Some of the claimants - such as commercial advertisers or contribu
tors to political campaigns241 - were persons whose expressions had
explicitly or implicitly received little First Amendment protection prior
to the 1 970s.242 Others - such as those who burned crosses on the

241. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (commer
cial speech); Vrrginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vrrginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (same); Federal Election Commn. v. National Conservative Politi
cal Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (campaign contributions and expenditures);
First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (same); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (same).
242. Prior to the 1 970s there was an absence of First Amendment challenges to
corrupt practices legislation, such as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 18
U.S.C. § 602 (1994), which required all political organizations to render a detailed ac
counting of contributions received and expenditures made for the purpose of influencing
the election of presidential electors or candidates in two or more states. The constitu
tionality of that act was upheld in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), but
only on the issue of whether Congress possessed sufficient power to regulate state elec
tions. No First Amendment issues were raised in Burroughs, and Congress took for
granted its power to place ceilings on the amount of contributions and expenditures by
individuals, doing so in the Hatch Political Activity Act of 1939, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1 147
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 and 18 U.S.C.).
Commercial advertising and campaign expenditures involving corporations were
treated as "part of the commercial sector" and "thus outside the regular system of free-
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property of neighbors as expressions of their racial animosity243 - had
been treated as either engaging in lower value speech or not engaging
in speech at all.244
The emergence of unexpected First Amendment beneficiaries since
the mid-1970s conventionally has been described in commentary as a
surprising liberalization of free speech jurisprudence by a Court taken
to be more conservative in its general outlook than the Warren Court of
the 1960s.245 From the perspective of this article, such conventional po
litical labels are misleading. The recent cases creating new beneficiaries
of the free speech principle can be seen more fruitfully as examples of
the theoretical fragmentation of twentieth-century free speech jurispru
dence brought about by the severance of the concept of freedom from
democratic theory.
One way to approach the various expressions implicated in the
new beneficiary cases is to consider them, simultaneously, as potential
exemplars of cognitive or emotive freedom and as potential tests of an
asserted inextricable connection between free speech and the ideal of
democracy. Under this approach, one would ask which of the expres
sions could be said to receive First Amendment protection because they
manifest

both

freedom and democratic theory; and which, by contrast,

could be said to threaten democratic theory or to have arisen in contexts

dom of expression." EMERSON, SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 640; see Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 3 1 6 U.S. 52 (1942).
243. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (concerning cross
burning as group defamation or hate speech).
244. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 3 1 0 (1940), and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 3 1 5 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), referred to "epithets or personal abuse" as
"not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution," Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10, and as falling within "certain . . . classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem," Chaplinsky, 3 15 U.S. at 571-72. See also Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952) (upholding a statute making it a crime to portray
"depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race,
color, creed or religion, which . . . exposes [those citizens] to contempt, derision or ob
loquy"). The statute was enforced against the president of the White Circle League,
who had distributed a pamphlet identifying "the negro" with "aggressions, rapes, rob
beries, knives, guns, and marijuana," and with "the . . . encroachment, harassment and
invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods, and persons." 343 U.S. at 252.
As late as Cohen the issue of whether "symbolic expressions" such as wearing
clothes with messages or burning flags or crosses amounted to speech was still regarded
as up for grabs: three of the four dissenting justices asserted that "Cohen's absurd and
immature antic . . . was mainly conduct and little speech" and thus completely unpro
tected. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
245. An illustrative example of this line of commentary is Keith Werhan, The Lib
eralization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REv. 5 1
(1994).
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where the goals of democratic theory and individual freedom appear
incompatible.
1.

Commercial Speech

If we consider the set of protected expressions in the unexpected
beneficiary cases in this fashion, the recent severance of freedom from
democratic theory in free speech jurisprudence becomes apparent. In

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun
cil 246 the first case squarely holding247 that purely commercial expres
,

sions were entitled to a measure of First Amendment protection, the
Court suggested that "the free flow of commercial information" - in
this instance about the prices of prescription drugs - was not only "in
dispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system," it was also essential "to the formation of intelligent opinions
as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. "248 One set of
commentators called this argument " a non sequitur" and maintained
that "in terms of relevance to political decisionmaking, advertising is
neither more nor less significant than a host of other market activities
that legislatures concededly may regulate. "249
That insight seems accurate.

Virginia Pharmacy represented

a situ

ation, common enough in the years after 1940, in which a legislative
majority had concluded that regulation of market activity was necessary
to promote consumer welfare, whether or not individual consumers
wanted the activity to be regulated. The Virginia legislature was con
cerned that advertising of prescription drug prices might induce con
sumers to trade off quality against price, with potentially adverse health
effects. The Court, straining to demonstrate that the regulation affected
"public decisionmaking in a democracy,"250 suggested that because in
formation about the price of drugs might enhance the individual eco
nomic choices of consumers, that information would necessarily also
enhance the collective political choices of consumers who would then
have an enhanced basis for evaluating policies directed toward deregu
lation of the pharmaceutical industry.251 But one just as well could have

246. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
247. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn. on Human Relations Commn.,
413 U.S. 376 (1973), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), suggested that Val
entine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) was on shaky ground.
248. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
249. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Eco
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1979).
250. 425 U.S. at 765.
251. See 425 U.S. at 765.
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argued that by electing representatives who chose to regulate commer
cial speech for the protection of consumers, individual citizens had al
ready signaled their political choices.
The fact was that a decision expanding protection for commercial
speech bore only a remote nexus to the self-governance rationale. It
was, rather, a product of a progression in Meiklejohnian logic that actu
ally served to redirect speech-protective jurisprudence away from his
central distinction between public and private speech. Mindful that a
narrow definition of public speech would place in an unprotected cate
gory most forms of literary and artistic expression, Meiklejohn, we have
seen, expanded his conception of public speech to include nonobscene

art and literature on the theory that exposure to such expressions edu
cated the citizenry and thus enhanced the climate that nurtured demo
cratic theory and self-governance.252
The inclusion of artistic and literary expression in a protected cate
gory of public expression may well have made conceptual and strategic
sense to Meiklejohn and his supporters, but it helped elevate to pro
tected status a variety of expressions engaged in for profit. Thus by the

Virginia Pharmacy appeared on the

time

Court's docket, not only was it

settled that books, magazines, and paintings did not forfeit First
:Amendment protection because they were sold commercially, but paid
political advertisements253 and other communications "dependen[t] . . .
on the expenditure of money"254 also had been included within a pro
tected category of speech.
Although decisions expanding First Amendment protection for ar
guably expressive activity that took place in a commercial setting took
pains

to

suggest

a

connection

governance,255 a passage in

between

the

Virginia Pharmacy

activity

and

self

was more revealing of

the principal rationale of the Court's commercial speech cases. In that
passage the Court acknowledged that "the particular consumer's inter
est in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if
not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political de
bate. "256 Protection for commercial speech harmonized with a view of
First Amendment speakers as autonomous individuals seeking to make
choices that reflected their utility preferences. As one commentator put
it, " [i]f free speech was defended with the metaphor of the market, it

252. See Meiklejohn, supra note 201, at 262-66.
253. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
254. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 6 (1976) (upholding First Amendment protec
tion for campaign expenditures)
255. See New York Tunes, 376 U.S. at 273-76; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, 52-53.
256. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
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was only a matter of time . . . before the market was defended with the
metaphor and substance of free speech. "257
2.

Political Campaigns and Expenditures

In cases deriving a First Amendment right to make unlimited ex
penditures, and limited contributions, to political campaigns,258 the
Court confronted situations in which the legislative rationale for re
stricting the amount of money that could be channeled into a political
campaign was directly tied to democratic theory. Congress and the
states assumed that unlimited campaign contributions or expenditures
created the possibility of unequal access to the electoral process on the
part of citizens. Money begat access, and access begat influence, poten
tially undermining the

egalitarian

premises

of participatory

self

government.259
But even though it identified this rationale in the contribution
expenditure cases, the Court concluded that it was insufficient, at least
where expenditures were concerned, to withstand an individual's First
Amendment claim to access to political candidates. Neither individuals,
corporations, nor political organizations could be prohibited from ex
pending sums of money on political campaigns, whatever the conse
quences for the political process.260
One could conceptualize these cases as presenting intractable
problems for the self-governance rationale. If free speech were identi
fied with self-governance, would self-governance be furthered by grant
ing individual citizens

maximum

access to the political process, so that

they could participate as freely as possible, or granting them

equal

ac

cess to the political process, so that the participation of others did not
dilute their contributions? This intractability can be associated with
democratic theory itself, which posits both individualistic and egalita
rian conceptions of citizen participation.
But if campaign financing can be seen as conceptually intractable,
it certainly had not been treated as doctrinally intractable by the Court
prior to the 1970s. Legislative efforts to restrict campaign contributions
and expenditures, on the part of both individuals and corporations, had
been treated as unproblematic. They had been seen as prototypical leg
islative allocations among economic rights in cases involving commer-

257. Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW: A

PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 260 (David Kairys ed., 1982).

258. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); First
Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
259. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29.
260. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790-92; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-59.
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cial activity. Thus the unexpected dimensions of the First Amendment
campaign finance cases, from the point of view of established free
speech doctrine, were that the Court had swept a hitherto economic
right into the category of a speech right and then concluded that the
First Amendment required courts to intervene in the process of legisla
tive allocations to protect the right to spend as much money on a cam
paign as one chose. In one of the standard areas in which the bifurcated
review project anticipated judicial deference - scrutiny of reasonable
legislative allocations of economic activities undertaken in the name of
democratic theory - the Court had read the First Amendment as re
quiring judicial intervention. And since the beneficiaries of that inter
vention were neither the traditional mavericks whose speech had been
repressed nor other types of

Carolene Products minorities

habitually de

nied access to the legislative forum, the Court's intervention, to those
invested in the bifurcated review project, may well have appeared not
only unexpected but, given the memory of Lochner, ominous. 261
3.
It is possible to see

"Hate Speech"

RA. V. v. City of St. Paul262 - in

which the Su

preme Court invalidated a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance applied to
criminalize burning a cross on the front lawn of a black family as a
means of communicating racial animus - as illustrating the same theo
retical fragmentation of free speech jurisprudence typified by the other
unexpected beneficiary cases. More fundamentally, it is possible to see
the issues raised in

RA. V.

as evidence that free speech jurisprudence

has begun to fragment because of the increasing incompatibility of the
central premises of modernism. Two dimensions of

RA. V.

lend them

selves to this line of analysis. One demonstrates that the case, like the
previous unexpected beneficiary cases, presents a conflict between free
dom and democratic theory. The other, which was present in a more
muted form in the commercial speech and campaign finance cases,

261. The problem with conceiving the contributions to and expenditures of politi
cal campaigns as another example of speakers seeking to enter the marketplace of ideas
is that the market of information about political candidates is not limitless. It is signifi
cantly affected by the access of speakers to certain information outlets, such as the
broadcast media, that dominate the market Money - generated by campaign contribu
tions and expenditures - largely controls that access. Thus one could argue that even if
a true marketplace of ideas exists for ordinary speech, sorting out popular from unpopu
lar, true from false expressions, it does not exist with respect to information about polit
ical campaigns. Instead, one has the equivalent of "market failure," justifying govern
ment intervention to equalize the position of speakers through campaign finance
restrictions.
262. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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demonstrates that R.A. V. presents a conflict between freedom and equal
ity. Locating the latter conflict in an intellectual history of free speech
in the twentieth century requires a brief detour.

a. The Emergence of the Equality Premise in First Amendment Ju
risprudence. One of the central developments of constitutional jurispru
dence from the 1950s through the 1980s was the growing momentum of
arguments from the premise of radical equality, or what one commenta
tor called the "antidiscrimination principle."263 Not only did the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment emerge as a constitu
tional lodestar in those years,264 commentators began to suggest that the
idea of equality was one of the foundations

of free speech in

America.265 A series of cases, those focusing on the concept of a "pub
lic forum" for expression, made it plain that the antidiscrimination prin
ciple had begun to radiate in First Amendment cases.266
The idea of equality can also be associated with the cognitive free
dom premise of modernist consciousness. If the innate cognitive capa
bilities of humans were an important shaping force in the cosmos, it
made sense to recognize the innate p9tential of all humankind, and thus
not to treat some humans as worth more than others. At the same time,
.
if tyranny and arbitrariness were to be checked, it made sense to give
humans equal concern and respect. The momentum of egalitarianism
and the antidiscrimination principle thus logically flowed from modern
ist epistemological assumptions.
But of course the antidiscrimination principle, with its accompany
ing premise of radical human equality, could also be at odds with the
premise of cognitive freedom. Indeed the association of equality with
the idea of America as a democracy can be seen as potentially contrib
uting to the severance of freedom from democratic theory. Treating all
humans equally meant, arguably, giving equal respect to all human ex
pressions, even if the content of those expressions was offensive to a
majority of the citizens in a democracy, and even if that majority had

263. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REv. l (1976). By "radical equality" I simply mean the proposition that as a
normative matter differences among human beings should presumptively be regarded as
insignificant, so that policies that treat humans unequally are presumptively suspect.
264. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection,
90 MICH. L. REv. 213 (1991).
265. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
266. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 5572 (1 983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 849-70 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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"voted," in the form of a legislative enactment, to censure the offensive
expressions. Thus the premise of radical human equality sometimes re
inforced, and sometimes conflicted with, a theory of widespread protec
tion for individual expression, and it sometimes reinforced, and some
times conflicted with, the model of democratic politics in America.

b.

R.A.V.

and the Puu.le of "Hate Speech." Given the cross-cur
R.A. V. can be seen as a complicated, possibly in

rents described above,

tractable puzzle. Statutes proscribing hate speech, like all statutes distin
guishing between higher value and lower value speech, offend the
equality principle by labeling some ideas as not worth saying. They also
arguably offend democratic theory because by excluding some ideas
from public discourse they presumably deprive the proponents of those
ideas of an opportunity to influence public policy.
But the same statutes, in their content, arguably reinforce the an
tidiscrimination principle as well. They also arguably reinforce the idea
of democracy in America, at least if one adopts Meiklejohn's dictum
that what is essential in a society dedicated to political self-government
is "not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall
be said. "267
One could defend hate speech statutes, in fact, by starting from
Meiklejohnian premises and merging them with arguments based on the
antidiscrimination principle. One could argue that the expressions pro
scribed by the St. Paul ordinance in

RA. V.

were precisely those that

could be expected to offend others because they conveyed coarse ani
mosities, or indulged in crude stereotypes, and thus denied the proposi
tion that all persons in America should be treated with equal concern
and respect. In seeking to eliminate such expressions from public dis
course, the framers of the ordinance suggested that equality in America
requires respect for others not only in theory but in practice. Moreover,
by eliminating such expressions from public discourse, the ordinance
arguably reinforced the principle of democratic self-government by
designating certain worthless and distracting expressive activities as
wasteful of the time and energies of a majority of the citizens, who
should be encouraged to devote their limited resources to constructive
activities that benefit the political community.
In addition, the premise of cognitive freedom could cut both ways
in

RA. V.

One could argue that hate speech ordinances infringe upon the

self-fulfillment of the proscribed speakers. One could also argue, how267. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 25. It should be pointed out that
Meiklejohn also referred, in numerous places, to "[t]he unabridged freedom of public
discussion." Id. at 91. Thus it is not clear what he meant by "everything worth
saying."
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ever, that protection for hate speech legitimates that variety of speech,
invites it into public debate, and creates the risk that those who do not
share the animosities or who reject the stereotypes may be deterred
from expressing their views. Finally, one could argue that unlimited
protection for hate speech offends the freedom of the majority to be
lieve that hate speech is wrong, harmful, and should no more be legiti
mated than cigarettes or cocaine.
Thus

RA. V.

can be shown to continue the pattern of theoretical

fragmentation in free speech jurisprudence.

R.A. V.

implicitly asks the

Court not only to decide whether it prefers freedom to democracy or to
equality in First Amendment jurisprudence, but to decide what defini
tions of freedom, democracy, and equality are compatible with the First
Amendment. It is no wonder that RA. V. is the case most frequently as
sociated with the emergence of a retrenchment in free speech jurispru
dence, a retrenchment in which Wigmore's distinction between "free
dom of speech and freedom of thuggery" and Meiklejohn's distinction

between everyone speaking and everything worth saying have been
revived.
B.

Sunstein and the Retrenchment of Free Speech Theory
1.

Retrenchment and the Bifurcated Review Project

The elevation of self-fulfillment as a predominant First Amend
ment value, the emergence of unexpected beneficiaries of First Amend
ment protection, and the severance of freedom from democratic theory
in free speech opinions from at least the 1 970s have thrown into ques
tion a central assumption of bifurcated review: since economic alloca
tions were properly the province of the legislature, judicial deference to
legislative regulation of economic rights was appropriate, but First
Amendment rights were not economic rights. To those with traditionally
progressive or liberal political intuitions, these developments are fore
boding. The First Amendment rights given protection by the Court in
cases in the 1 970s and 1980s included those of large campaign contrib
utors, both individual and corporate, political action committees, and
commercial advertisers. These were not only willing and powerful par
ticipants in the economic marketplace, they were groups whose views
had ample representation in legislatures and significant access to legis
lators. In no sense were these beneficiaries of First Amendment protec-
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tion the powerless minorities of

Carolene Products.268
Lochner.
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They more re

sembled the employers of bakery workers in

As freedom in First Amendment jurisprudence became succes
sively severed from the other premises of modernism, conventional
characterizations of those who favored aggressive judicial review in
First Amendment cases and deferential review in economic regulation
cases broke down. Judges pictured as conservatives joined Justices seen
as liberals to form the majorities in the unexpected beneficiary cases.269
It may have been this development coupled with the spectre of a dis
cernible conservative, Justice Scalia, authoring the opinion in

RA.V.,

that galvanized commentators into action. It may also have been some
thing more ephemeral but also more fundamental: a sense that free
speech jurisprudence was suddenly antifoundationalist, lacking theoreti
cal rudders, "up for grabs. "270 If so, despite the apparent inexorability
of First Amendment libertarianism over the course of the twentieth cen
tury, a theoretical retrenchment might be possible.
At any rate, the 1990s has produced a striking number of argu
ments suggesting that the value of freedom for expressive activity can
and should be qualified in the service of a more civil and less corrosive
model for communities of discourse in America, a model in which civic
responsibility and respect for others is taken at least as seriously as
freedom and rights. Most of the arguments can be said to be associated
with the issue of hate speech, especially if pornography, another area
that has spawned calls for restrictions on expressive activity, is charac
terized, as many of its opponents would characterize it, as a version of

268. The yearning in the academic community as late as the 1 980s to retain mo
mentum for the project of bifurcated review can be seen in the wide acclaim generated
by John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust and Jesse Choper's Judicial Review and the
National Political Process, two works that appeared in 1980 and were explicit attempts
to engraft a Carolene Products exception on a general theory of deferential judicial re
view in constitutional cases. The works shared the American Association of Law
Schools' Order of the Coif Triennial Book Award in 1983.
269. For example, Justice Blackmun, conventionally identified as a liberal on the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, was prominently involved in carving out protection for
commercial speech, as was Justice Powell, conventionally identified as a conservative.
For example, see Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In contrast, then-Justice Rehnquist initially opposed such
protection and dissented in Virginia Pharmacy.
270. That is surely the message of STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH TmNG AS
FREE SPEECH (1994). The very intervention of Fish, a prominent antifoundationalist,
into debates about free speech might be taken as a signal that foundational premises in
First Amendment jurisprudence are under strain. The collapse of foundational premises
in an area of scholarly discourse appears to energize Fish: see his comments on tradi
tional standards of textual criticism in STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A Tmcr IN Tms
CLASS? (1980).
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stereotyped

and

degraded.271
But at least one prominent commentator, Cass Sunstein, has called
for a broader retrenchment of free speech jurisprudence, one intended to
affect not only unexpected beneficiary cases but others he finds trouble
some.272 Because Sunstein incorporates the contributions of opponents
of hate speech into his own arguments and gives an extended theoretical
justification for the reconfiguration of First Amendment jurisprudence
he proposes, a focus on his work as representative of current retrench
ment theory seems appropriate.273
2.

Sunstein and the Legacy of Speech-Protective Jurisprudence

Here is how Sunstein sees the current world of First Amendment
jurisprudence:
In the last decade, the commitments that emerged from the previous gen
eration of free speech law have come under severe strain. . . . There are
abundant ironies in this. For one thing, the new coalitions have spurred
plausible arguments of hypocrisy and brinkmanship. Free speech advo
cates say that the liberal's commitment to free speech has been aban
doned as soon as it turns out that the commitment is inconvenient, or re
quires protection for causes that are unpopular with liberals. . . .
On the other hand, the broad enthusiasm for application of free
speech principles to the new settings seems ironic as well, especially
when it comes from conservatives usually respectful of tradition and of
the need for restrained use of the Constitution. . . . Insistence on the pro
tection of all words and pictures seems especially odd when it is urged
by people who otherwise proclaim the need for judicial restraint.274

271. I am thinking here of the contributions of Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence,
Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Crenshaw on hate speech and of Catharine MacKinnon
on pornography and hate speech. See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMEND
MENT (1993); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
272. Sunstein lists, in addition to commercial advertising, campaign finance regu
lation, hate speech (including pornography), "speech in connection with the sale of se
curities, sexual and racial harassment in the workplace, scientific speech, nude dancing
. . . and regulation designed to produce quality and diversity in broadcasting." CASS
R SUNSTEIN DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 14 (1993).
273. In singling out Sunstein as representative of contemporary commentators ad
vocating a retrenchment of free speech theory, I do not want to be understood as sug
gesting that Sunstein's arguments and perspectives can be ranked, in some kind of hier
archy of stature, above those articulated in the work of a number of other contemporary
commentators on free speech. I have singled out Sunstein's work for the same reason I
singled out that of Emerson: in my judgment his work most clearly embodies the theo
retical orientation of free speech commentary at a particular point in time.
274. SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 14-16.
,
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But the fact that he perceives the current First Amendment land
scape as chaotic, or ironic, is not what galvanizes Sunstein to propose a
theoretical reconfiguration of free speech jurisprudence. It is that for
self-described liberals such as Sunstein275 the landscape is politically
threatening. The unexpected beneficiaries of recent libertarian free
speech jurisprudence potentially force liberals either to abandon "the
liberal's commitment to free speech" or to support "unpopular causes. "
Sunstein's response i s to propose a retrenchment o f the libertarian ten
dencies of free speech theory so as to exclude from its coverage some
of the unexpected beneficiaries of the last two decades.
The most significant feature of Sunstein's retrenchment, from the
perspective of this article, is not the substantive positions he endorses.
He would virtually deny constitutional protection to violent pomogra
phy,276 to a limited category of hate speech ("fighting words" involving
race, color, or creed),277 and to false or misleading commercial advertis
ing.278 None of the previous commentators showed an inclination to
protect those expressive activities,279 and support for their protection is
overwhelmingly unpopular in the current academic community, at least
among persons who define themselves, with Sunstein, as heirs to a lib
eral tradition of support for free speech.
In addition, Sunstein would permit government regulation of a
number of expressive activities, including campaign contributions and
expenditures,

communications

in the securities

industry,

scientific

speech, and electronic broadcasting.280 Deference to government regula
tion of speech in those areas can fairly said to be responsive to the fear
that large corporations and wealthy individuals, traditional bogeymen of

275. Sunstein associates himself with "the forms of liberalism" associated with
"the commitment to 'government by discussion,' " by which he means, in free speech
jurisprudence, commitment to the "idea . . . that . . . [l]iberal rights are pervasively
democratic," and that " [o]ne of their prime functions is to furnish the preconditions for
democratic deliberation." Id. at 248 (footnotes omitted).
276. See id. at 225.
277. See id. at 203-04.
278. See id. at 135, 220. I use the phrase "virtually deny" with respect to com
mercial advertising, violent pornography, and hate speech because Sunstein's approach
would not completely exclude those activities from the domain of First Amendment law
but rather would classify them as lower value, more regulable activities. See infra text
accompanying notes 285-92.
279. Even Emerson attempted to exclude "hard-core" or child pornography from
the class of protected expressive activities on the ground that it constituted action rather
than expression. See EMERSON, SYSTEM supra note 176, at 500-02. Emerson's discus
sion of pornography revealed that he was reacting viscerally against the logic of his
own libertarian theories of free speech.
280. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 87-88, 99-101, 163-64.
,

380

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:299

those committed to the bifurcated review project, recently have been
getting too much shelter from the First Amendment.
The results Sunstein would reach in current free speech controver
sies, in short, seem predictable consequences of a belief in an ideal of
bifurcated constitutional review and an identification with the tradition
of twentieth-century liberal reformist politics in America.28 1 More inter
esting, from the perspective of this article, is the theoretical apparatus
Sunstein proposes as a foundation for reframing free speech cases. That
apparatus represents an effort to respond to the severance of freedom
from democratic theory in First Amendment jurisprudence by insisting
that those premises be reconnected. Sunstein wants free speech jurispru
dence once again to insist that only speech intimately connected to the
processes of democracy receive full protection - that the only freedom
at the core of the First Amendment is democratic freedom. When un
packed, Sunstein 's perspective strikingly resembles that of Meiklejohn.
In erecting his theoretical foundations Sunstein employs four re
lated strategies. First, he asserts· that, under a "Madisonian" view of the
Constitution and the First Amendment, the central purpose of American
constitutional government is to further deliberative democracy.282 This
means that he shares Meiklejohn's belief that " 'political speech' lies at
the heart of constitutional concern. "283 But Meiklejohn's insistence that
private (nonpolitical) speech was not covered by the First Amendment
at all appears problematic to Sunstein, who chooses to "depart from
Meiklejohn" at this point.284
Sunstein's conclusion that Meiklejohn's bright-line distinction be
tween public and private speech was unworkable285 precipitates his sec
ond strategy. Rather than entirely exclude nonpolitical speech from First
Amendment protection, he revives the higher value-lower value catego
rization, tying it to a "two-tier" approach to free speech cases. Sun
stein's choice of the two-tier approach, in which even nonpolitical
speech is afforded some level of protection, enables him to incorporate
into his theoretical foundations for doctrinal retrenchment in free speech
jurisprudence what he characterizes as a "New Deal" approach to con
stitutional issues. That approach rejected absolutist conceptions of pri-

281. "With respect to freedom of expression," Sunstein maintains, "I think that
American constitutionalism has failed precisely to the extent that it has not taken the
New Deal reformation seriously enough." Id. at 34.
282. See id. at 1 8.
283. Id. at 122, 273 n.2.
284. See id.
285. Sunstein notes that Meiklejohn kept progressively expanding the meaning of
public or political speech as new difficulties for his interpretation arose. See id. at 273.
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vate (unregulable) and public (regulable) spheres of activity and recog

nized that distributions of material and intellectual resources took place
whenever the state chose to act or not to act.286 Sunstein proposes an
analogous approach to speech issues.
Sunstein's third strategy is to craft a syllogism in which his "delib
erative democracy" theory of the First Amendment is linked to his two
tier theory of speech. He argues that just as the New Deal approach to
economic issues obliterated the notion of a private sphere immune from
governmental regulation, free speech theory can obliterate two compa
rable notions, that there is a class of private speech in which the First
Amendment is not implicated at all, and that there is a class of public
speech that the government must necessarily leave unregulated.287
A two-tier approach to speech issues, according to Sunstein, would
treat all speech as theoretically regulable, but would establish a cate
gory of speech - "political" speech as Sunstein defines it - as pre
sumptively free from regulation, with a very strong burden on govern
ment to rebut that presumption. "Nonpolitical" speech would not be
completely outside the ambit of First Amendment protection, but the
government would bear a less severe burden of justifying its regulatory
efforts.288 Thus Sunstein's approach revives the higher value-lower
value distinction, but it includes even low value expressions within the
ambit of the First Amendment.
In order to develop his two-tier approach, Sunstein concededly
needs to treat the distinction between political and nonpolitical speech
as meaningful and central to First Amendment analysis. He is well

aware that in order to do this he needs to revive Meiklejohn's self
governance rationale as the central justification for freedom of speech,
which means undercutting the self-fulfillment rationale. This leads him
to his fourth strategy, that of reducing the significance of the value of
self-fulfillment, or, in his terms, the "autonomy principle,"289 in free
speech theory.
Sunstein suggests that the logic of self-fulfillment "make[s] it dif
ficult or impossible to distinguish . . . among different categories of
speech."290 If "we protect speech because people want to talk [or lis
ten]," Sunstein argues, "it is not easy to come up with standards by
which to distinguish among different kinds of talk."291 And if "we can-

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291 .

See id. at 30-32.
See id. at 35-38.
See id. at 37-38, 132-37.
See id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
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an approach based on self

fulfillment "will not be able to do what a theory of free speech is
obliged to do, that is, to make distinctions among different categories of
speech."292 So ultimately Sunstein's argument against autonomy be
comes more than a justification for his categories of analysis; it be
comes an insistence that when there are no standards for determining
why some speech is afforded more constitutional protection than others,
the very basis for singling out speech for constitutional protection is
undermined.
Having explored the strategies Sunstein employs in support of his
two-tier approach to First Amendment issues, we are now in a position
to locate his perspective in the intellectual history being set forth in this
article. Sunstein proposes a retrenchment, a breaking of the libertarian
momentum of free speech theory that has emerged in the period encom
passing Emerson's

The System of Freedom of Expression

and the unex

pected beneficiary cases. He grasps the potential conflict between free
dom and democratic theory in free speech theory and seeks to
reestablish an inextricable connection between free speech and the idea
of democracy in America. In short, he seeks to repair the strains in
modernist free speech jurisprudence.
The analytical linchpins of Sunstein's proposed retrenchment - a
two-tier approach to free speech cases in which the standard of judicial
scrutiny varies and a higher value-lower value distinction between cate
·
gories of speech that triggers the appropriate level of scrutiny - re
quire that speech tied to deliberative democracy be elevated to a more
protected position than other speech. Any other treatment of speech, for
Sunstein, raises the spectre of the self-fulfillment rationale run wild,
equating freedom with autonomy and severing it from the idea of de
mocracy in America.
With the appearance of Sunstein's proposed retrenchment of free
speech theory, which has strong echoes of Meiklejohn, one is tempted
to say that the twentieth-century intellectual history of First Amendment
jurisprudence shows signs, at the century's close, of doubling back on
itself. But the implications of a retrenchment in the libertarian progres
sion of free speech theory may be quite different from what Sunstein
may have intended. For although Sunstein openly identifies his re-

292. Id. One could argue, of course, that an "absolutist" view of protection for
speech, in which all forms of expression are given constitutional protection, does not di
minish the stature of speech. But the problem is that such an approach has never ex
isted: there have always been some forms of speech capable of being suppressed. So
there has always been an implicit valuing of the forms of speech given protection. Once
those forms become almost limitless, it is not clear what makes them valuable.
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trenchment with the Meiklejohn interpretation, the perspective he sup
plies on free speech issues bears traces not only of Meiklejohn, but of
the perspective exhibited by Wigmore in his criticism of Holmes's dis
sent in

Abrams.

In order to grasp this dimension of Sunstein's retrench

ment, we need to talce one more look, that of a concluding overview, at
the twentieth-century intellectual history of free speech jurisprudence in
America.
CONCLUSION: THE DEATH OF FREE SPEECH?
A.

The Modernist Heritage of Free Speech Theory

Wigmore's position in his critique of Holmes in

Abrams

- that

leaflets directed toward workers in a munitions factory during wartime
could be treated as the equivalent of what Holmes called "any other
overt act we don't like"293 and suppressed as if they were bombs or any
other examples of thuggery - proceeded, we have seen, from the pre
mise that freedom of speech was simply another of the ancient rights
and liberties of English-speaking citizens, liberties that could be sup
pressed if they threatened the state itself. The difference between Wig
more's and Holmes's perspectives toward the sort of speech implicated
in

Abrams

was that Wigmore attached no special value to speech that

distinguished it from other forms of activity. Holmes, on the other hand,
associated "the ultimate good" in the universe with "free trade in
ideas" and asserted that such an association was "the theory of the
Constitution. "294 Holmes was thereby suggesting that cognitive free
dom, as embodied in speech, ought to be treated as constitutionally and
culturally privileged because it facilitated a search for truth on which
rational policymaking ultimately was grounded. That conception of
First Amendment freedom was associated, by Chafee, with "the social
interest in attainment of truth. "295
We have seen that Holmes's and Chafee's implicit definitions of
the "meaning" of free speech followed from modernist premises. Thus
one way to explain the early and mid-twentieth-century discovery of
speech as a central cultural value, and the associated elevation of First
Amendment rights to a status of high constitutional significance, is to
see them as consequences of the broad acceptance in America of mod
ernist causal explanations of experience.

293. Holmes made this statement as late as 1918, before writing his dissent in

Abrams. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to Harold J. Laski (July 7, 1 9 1 8) in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETIERS, supra note 63, at 160, 161.
294. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
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But at the same time we have seen that the modernist-inspired per
spective on free speech advanced by Holmes in Abrams and synthesized
by Chafee in

Freedom of Speech

was by no means orthodoxy in the

early twentieth century. On the contrary, the perspective on free speech
illustrated by Wigmore's critique, the roots of which we have seen in
premodernist theories of causal attribution, exhibited remarkable staying
power as an orthodoxy, as it was not displaced until the 1 930s. The
controlling evaluative standard for subversive activities cases remained
bad tendency until that decade, and that standard had its own roots in
the orthodox late nineteenth-century perspective embodied in Wig
more's critique of the Abrams dissent.
Thus it would be erroneous to assert that the idea of speech being
culturally and constitutionally special in America had become en
trenched in the first three decades of the twentieth century, although
that idea was growing in momentum. It also would be erroneous to
claim that the central premises of modernism had become widely inter
nalized in American culture in those decades. Those premises were in
the air between 1900 and 1930, especially among progressive intellectu
als, but in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence they competed with
premodernist premises.

Children's HospitaP.96

Lochner,

after all, was revived in

Adkins v.

in the 1 920s and remained orthodoxy in due pro

cess cases until 1937.297
The appearance of Meiklejohn's

Free Speech

in 1 948 can be taken

as signifying that modernist premises had come to control the orienta
tion of free speech jurisprudence, and that enhanced protection for free
speech

was

the

driving

force

in

the

bifurcated

review

project.

Meiklejohn's elevation of self-governance to the primary rationale for
protecting freedom of speech, his substitution of the town meeting met
aphor for the now pejorative marketplace of ideas metaphor, his bright
line distinction between "public" and "private" speech, and his explicit
linking of the cultural value of free speech to democratic theory were
each signals that the intellectual history of free speech jurisprudence in
America had entered another phase. In particular, they were signals that
modernist

assumptions

about the close connections

b"tween free

speech, a democratic model of politics, and the conditions of modernity
- the same assumptions that had driven the intuitive characterization
of First Amendment rights as occupying a preferred constitutional posi
tion - had become embodied in a self-contained, comprehensive per
spective on free speech.

296. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
297. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins).
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The modernist premises of Meiklejohn's perspective, we have
seen, were that in a universe in which humans had come to be thought
of as the principal causal agents affecting their destiny, and in a nation
whose governmental system presupposed a democratic model of polit
ics, speech was more than just an activity in which Americans partici
pated. The free expression of ideas, channeled along the lines of empiri
cal inquiry and rational policymaking, was a precondition to effective
governance in America. Freedom of speech, as the preferred position
cases suggested, was an indispensable requirement of democratic
theory.
Chafee and Holmes

had

started

with

similar premises.

But

Meiklejohn had developed them into a fullblown interpretation of the
First Amendment. That interpretation contamed an overriding rationale
for protecting speech; an explicit linking of cognitive freedom to demo
cratic theory; an explicit association of enhanced judicial protection for
public speech with the bifurcated review project; and, with the legacy
of Lochner in mind, an analytical formula for including and excluding
given categories of expression from First Amendment protection. That
formula encapsulated the intuitive judicial efforts, in the preferred posi
tion cases, to distinguish high value from low value speech.
1\vo additional features of the Meiklejohn interpretation, both pre
viously discussed, underscore its modernist dimensions. One was that it

was incompatible with the perspective on speech I have associated with
premodemist jurisprudential orthodoxy. For Meiklejohn, First Amend
ment speech rights could never be lined up against state police powers

in the fashion of nineteenth-century doctrinal analysis because of their
special constitutional and cultural status. The problem with Holmes's
clear and present danger standard was that it had echoes of this police
power analytic. Meiklejohn assumed that political speech could never
pose a clear and present danger to the American government because it
was the principal foundation of that government.298 Meiklejohn's cate
gory of constitutionally protected speech thus could come to equal what
Wigmore called thuggery. Once the premises of the Meiklejohn inter
pretation were granted, Wigmore's belief that some concededly political
expressions nonetheless could be suppressed because they offended the
social interest in preserving order, civilized discourse, and morality was
necessarily abandoned. Meiklejohn, in fact, had gone well beyond
Holmes.299

298. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 146, at 89-91.
299. Meiklejohn directed a fair amount o f his energy i n Free Speech t o disassoci
ating his perspective from the theory of free speech he ascribed to Holmes, and he in-
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The other feature of Meiklejohn's
acceptance

of

the

premises

of
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Free Speech

modernist

that signals wide

consciousness

was

Meiklejohn's blithe conviction that his formula for deciding speech
cases

posed

few

significant conceptual

and practical

difficulties.

Meiklejohn, and those who followed his interpretation, proceeded as if
everyone knew which types of expressions qualified as public or pri
vate, higher or lower value speech. Although Meiklejohn progressively
extended his category of public expressions, he took as beyond dispute
the fundamental distinction between private and public speech and
sought to solve particular free speech puzzles, such as the status of liter
ary or artistic expression, within the distinction's parameters.
The progression of free speech jurisprudence from Meiklejohn
through Emerson to the unexpected beneficiary cases, however, sug
gests that the original premises that drove the enshrinement of freedom
of speech as a constitutional and cultural value had lost their integrated,
self-reinforcing quality. As First Amendment jurisprudence has become
increasingly speech protective, freedom as autonomy or self-fulfillment
has taken on emotive as well as cognitive dimensions and has separated
itself, and come to compete with, freedom as self-governance. And as
the assumed naturalness of Meiklejohnian doctrinal categories, which
prevented economic rights from taking on the stature of speech rights,
has collapsed, an important modernist function of speech-protective
First Amendment jurisprudence, that of nourishing and sustaining the
bifurcated review project, has been threatened.
These developments may well signify the fracturing of the central
premises of modernist American constitutional jurisprudence, premises
that helped channel constitutional doctrine300 along the familiar and re
assuring paths created by modernist American jurisprudence - the
paths of empiricist inquiry and rational policymaking within a demo
cratic model of politics. In the unexpected beneficiary cases, and in
other cases, most conspicuously obscenity cases, Meiklejohnian catego-

eluded in his discussion an extended critique of the clear and present danger standard.
See, e.g., id. at 70-90.
300. I believe that the judicially deferential treatment of legislation challenged
under the Commerce Clause or Due Process Clauses - the other prong of the original
bifurcated review project - can also be fruitfully analyzed from the perspective
adopted in this article. I am currently pursuing that project and might venture, at this
point, that evidence suggests that the elevation of Holmes's 1905 critique of Lochner to
juristic orthodoxy in Supreme Court due process cases in the late 1 930s, and the analo
gous development of deferential judicial review in Commerce Clause jurisprudence in
the same time period, can be closely linked to the transformation of the central premises
of modernist consciousness, at least among elite judges and legal commentators, from a
marginal and contested cultural status to one of intellectual orthodoxy.
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ries of speech have been blurred, and the assumption that eventually ei
ther the marketplace of ideas or the processes of self-government will
subject expression to empiricist or rationalist constraints appears to
have been abandoned. In some of those cases speech, now expanded to
include emotive as well as cognitive expressions, appears to be pro
tected simply because it is an embodiment of the feelings or tastes of an
individual.
B.

The Shadow of Wigmore: Premodernist Free Speech Theory and
Retrenchment
Sunstein has recognized that if everyone can speak on any subject,

not only does no intelligible governing theory of free speech exist, but
speech itself has ceased to be regarded as special. Meiklejohn took that
proposition as a given and sought to implement it by identifying a cate
gory of speech that needed to be given constitutionally protected status
in a modern, democratic society, and by protecting ·only that speech. If
the modernist premises that guided Meiklejohn seem as much self
opposing as self-reinforcing, or even potentially unintelligible, perhaps
one is left only with the autonomy of individual speakers and listen
ers. 301 How, then, does contemporary free speech jurisprudence avoid
conferring First Amendment protection on everyone, and thus arguably
robbing free speech of its special status in America?
That question tempts Sunstein to revive the Meiklejohn interpreta
tion as a guide for retrenchment. But Meiklejohn's perspective was not
formulated in a vacuum. As a historical actor, situated in his own time,
Meiklejohn can be said to have stood in the shadow of Wigmore and
those who had invested in the premodernist premises of early twentieth
century theoretical orthodoxy in free speech jurisprudence. Meiklejohn,
of course, rejected those premises, but he supplanted them with a com
parably strongly held set of his own. His conviction that only public
speech need be protected, since only that form of speech embodied the

301 . For example, if one treats truth and rationality as ideological, socially con
structed, and contingent concepts, one can hardly expect them to channel speech con
sistently in the direction of wise collective public decisions, at least in Meiklejohn's
sense. Thus if wisdom is taken to be the equivalent of short-run, ideologically depen
dent constructions of current experience, one might as well let everyone speak and
count all speech of equal value. Wisdom will emerge anyway, the product not of the in
herent cogency of any expression but of a series of predetermined interpretive canons or
culturally imposed ideological boundaries. Under such postmodernist conditions one
could argue that in America, at least, it is more consistent with egalitarian and antitotal
itarian traditions, as well as the text of the Constitution, to let everyone speak on any
subject rather than having government powerholders dictate the parameters of protected
speech.
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special cultural and constitutional status of the First Amendment, was
just as confidently maintained as Wigmore's conviction that he and his
contemporaries could easily discern the line between speech and
thuggery.
What Wigmore and Meiklejohn shared in common, then, was a set
of foundational premises that enabled them to know the boundaries be
tween protected and unprotected expression. The premises were radi
cally different, but their assumed foundational status was similar.
Alongside that one might compare Justice Harlan's statement in

v. California

Cohen

that "we think it is largely because governmental officials

cannot make principled distinctions in [the] area [of expression] that the
Constitution leaves matters

of taste and style so largely to the

individual. "302
So neither Sunstein, nor any of us, can wholly restore Meiklejohn's
interpretation of the First Amendment because we cannot wholly restore
his intellectual and contextual universe. Our foundational premises, if
we have any, are not his. Indeed one of the arguably troubling features
of the collapse of Meiklejohn's categorization scheme, the progression
of free speech libertarianism, and the fragmentation of First Amend
ment jurisprudence is that it acquaints us to the possibility that no over
reaching perspective on free speech issues can be formulated, because
there is currently no agreement as to the foundational premises on
which such a perspective might be built.
Suppose, then, that First Amendment jurisprudence is destined to
be in a fragmented state for at least the balance of this century. Sup
pose, further, that a group of potentially influential commentators, the
retrenchment theorists, are deeply troubled by that possible trend, either
because of their ideological distaste for the results in the unexpected
beneficiary cases, or because of the threat those cases pose for the pro
ject of bifurcated constitutional review, or, more fundamentally, be
cause of their belief in the proposition that when everyone can speak
and anything can be said freedom of speech may well lose its special
place in American civilization.
Then a retrenchment may be attempted, but it cannot replicate
Meiklejohn's universe. It can only take place in the universe of the last
years of the twentieth century: a universe in which the foundationalist
premises that elevated modernism to a position of influence are, at best,
contested. Given our current epistemological climate, what confidence
can one have that the foundational premises of Sunstein 's retrenchment
- that speech associated with deliberative democracy be favored, that a

302. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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two-tier theory of protection for speech be implemented, that autonomy
be abandoned as a central First Amendment principle - will be ac
cepted? Each bristles with conceptual and practical difficulties in appli
cation, difficulties akin to those that Meiklejohn ignored.303 Perhaps
those difficulties could be solved in the short run if each of us shared
Sunstein's commitments to the liberal political agenda of the New Deal
and to the accompanying bifurcated review project. But the emergence
of unexpected candidates for First Amendment protection, candidates
incompatible with the original ideological orientation of bifurcated re
view, itself suggests that Sunstein's commitments are not universally
shared.
Sunstein, doubtless aware that he cannot assume that the founda
tional premises of his retrenchment approach will be treated as un
problematic, has, we have seen, advanced another justification for mod
ifying the libertarian emphasis of current free speech theory. Here is
where I find the shadow of Wigmore lurking most prominently. Sun
stein has combined two arguments in his justification. One argument is
that libertarian free speech jurisprudence fails sufficiently to recognize
that what is special about speech in America is its indispensable con
nection to democratic deliberation. The other argument is that the pro
gression of libertarian free speech jurisprudence ultimately may become
so overprotective of speech as to rob speech of its special constitutional
and cultural status.
The two arguments could be combined to reach the conclusion that
if one wants to preserve the special status of speech in America, there

303. To take just one example, how does Sunstein's reformulation of free speech
theory solve the problem of hate speech, one of his central concerns? Composed of ster
eotyping assertions and generalizations, hate speech unmistakably expresses an ideolog
ical point of view, and even holds up a vision of a "good society," one that creates a
social hierarchy resting on the truth of such generalizations. It is thus clearly political
speech and would seem to be speech inviting dialogue and deliberation. Sunstein, how
ever, would not protect at least two forms of hate speech: speech associated with hate
crimes, such as the burning of a cross on the property of a black family protected in
R.A.V., that is "limited to the exceedingly narrow category of unprotected fighting
words," and speech in a college or university that is singled out as "incompatible with
[the institution's] educational mission." SUNSTEIN, supra note 272, at 192, 203.
Such an approach revives the older, and arguably shaky, Chaplinsky categorization
of high and low value speech - after Cohen, one person's fighting words may now be
another's music, and after R.A.V. that categorization cannot support viewpoint-discrimi
natory restrictions on hate speech. It then adds an undefended assertion that the state, as
in R.A. V., has a greater interest in suppressing speech that causes anger on the basis of
race, color, or creed, than on the basis, say, of gender, sexual preference, size, or age.
One may agree completely with Sunstein's analysis of hate speech cases. The point
is simply that his categorization of protected speech seems as capable of being con
tested as that advanced by Meiklejohn.
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seems no reason to give significant constitutional protection to those ex
pressive activities that are taken to be largely unconnected to the demo
cratic governmental process. There also seems ample reason to allow
those

institutions

that allegedly personify

democracy

and

reflect

majoritarian views - legislatures - to restrict individual forms of ex
pression if they conclude that the expressions in question bear no rea
sonable connection to the process of deliberative democracy. Under this
approach certain expressions might become candidates for restriction
because a majority of the public deemed them so inherently lacking in
stature as to not be worth deliberating about.
Treating speech in this fashion bears a striking resemblance to the
treatment of speech cases in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
police power cases, in which, as we as seen, individual constitutional
rights, whether implicating expression or not, were subordinated to gov
ernment interests in restricting them, such as morality, order, and de
cency. In Wigmore's hands such an approach easily sanctioned a legis
lative determination that certain kinds of expressive activities - such
as those engaged in by the defendants in

Abrams

- exemplified not

freedom of speech but freedom of thuggery. An approach that elevates
freedom of speech to an advantaged position primarily because it rein
forces deliberative democracy claims to be just as capable of identifying
what an appropriate subject for deliberation is as Wigmore was capable
of knowing when an expression amounted to thuggery.304
C.

The Paradox of Current Free Speech Theory

The intellectual history set forth in this article helps explain the
ways in which the proposed retrenchment of free speech jurisprudence,
as exemplified in Sunstein's work, has echoes of both Meiklejohn and

Wigmore. Sunstein expresses the hope that many of the discomforting

results of progressive libertarianism in First Amendment jurisprudence

304. Sunstein, of course, is not situated in the same point in time as Wigmore: he
advances his theories against the backdrop of a much more speech-protective First
Amendment jurisprudence. His two-tier theory of speech appears to include a number
of expressions as presumptive candidates for protection that Wigmore might have al
lowed legislatures categorically to restrict. But the shadow of Wigmore can nonetheless
be said to fall upon Sunstein, as it did upon Meiklejohn. For Sunstein's two-tier theory
of protection for speech to work smoothly, those implementing it need to have confi
dence that everyone will be able to discern the boundary between those expressions that
implicate deliberative democracy and those that do not, just as Wigmore's contemporar
ies were able confidently to discern the boundary between speech and thuggery. But
that very difficulty in erecting confident boundaries in free speech jurisprudence is ar
guably what has precipitated the recent explosion of libertarian, unexpected beneficiary
decisions.
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can be alleviated by a retrenchment premised on narrowing the constitu
tional and cultural meaning of speech in America. He offers that solu
tion as a guide for the twenty-first century, but the solution also has the
potential to restore something like the treatment of speech

that

predominated before the First Amendment came of age. A retrenchment
of free speech jurisprudence in the 1 990s thus might bring the century
of the First Amendment in America to a close in more than one sense.
A century earlier, speech in America was treated as one of the
time-honored liberties of English-speaking peoples. Spe,ech was no
more immune from government restrictions than any of those other lib
erties. That was the very conception of speech that Meiklejohn classi
fied as Fifth Amendment speech and sought to distinguish from the
First Amendment, public, unabridgable speech that he argued was indis
pensably connected to self-governance in a democratic society.
Of course Meiklejohn could sustain his faith that some speech was
unabridgable because of his conviction that the category of public
speech was easy to discern. Developments since the appearance of Free

Speech

undermined that assumption. As the category of public speech

got broader and broader, it became apparent that the expressions of
many individuals were being protected not because of their relevance to
public debate but because of their connection to the principle of human
cognitive and emotive freedom. At that point freedom came to be seen
as implicated in some unexpected contexts, and the impulse toward re
trenchment began.
Thus the paradox that current free speech theorists are confronting
is as follows: If one returns to a First Amendment jurisprudence in
which some expressions, by not furthering deliberative democracy or
meeting some other inclusionary criterion, are excluded from being can
didates for protection, one threatens to revive the categorical apparatus
for evaluating speech claims that resulted in speech rights being treated
as nothing special in late nineteenth-century America. On the other
hand, if one endorses the current libertarian progression of free speech
theory, emphasizing the connection between speech and individual au
tonomy in a pluralistic society, one appears to invite a world in which
anyone can talk on any subject; speech thus becomes the equivalent of
noise, and free speech theory becomes unintelligible. In neither in
stance, arguably, is free speech in America continuing to be treated as
special, continuing to be invested with the stature that the premises of
modernist consciousness conferred upon it.
I share some of the ideological goals of retrenchment theorists,
such as desiring a society in which the level of human discourse, and
the instincts and attitudes reflected in that discourse, becomes less
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coarse and more respectful of others. I also am opposed to some of
those goals, such as the project of channeling individual thoughts and
expressions into the rubrics of deliberative democracy, rubrics I find ei
ther confining or not easily intelligible. I am less disturbed than Sun
stein about the momentum of self-fulfillment in First Amendment juris
prudence, and the ideological perspective from which I address free
speech issues is less invested in the symbols of the New Deal and the
bifurcated review project than his.
But the purpose of this article has not been to offer specific sug
gestions about the resolution of contemporary First Amendment issues,
or to advance any overriding theoretical perspective on free speech. It
has been, rather, to place in historical perspective the paradox con
fronting contemporary commentators on free speech issues, so as to
gain some enhanced understanding of the predicament in which those of
us who teach and write about the First Amendment at the end of the
century in which it came of age find ourselves. The problem of the rela
tionship of hate speech cases to the constitutional and cultural status of
free speech in America, with which this article began, is just one sym
bol of that predicament. Behind it lies a rich, suggestive, and currently
troubling intellectual history.

